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I. INTRODUCTION 
The recent Great Recession soiled the credit reports of many 
Americans. Furthermore, advances in database technology have 
allowed employers and others wider access to comprehensive 
information about consumers, sometimes significantly narrowing the 
opportunities those consumers might have for employment, credit, 
housing, or insurance. These results have inspired some state 
legislatures to revise their credit reporting statutes to ameliorate the 
percussive effects of the economic crisis on their citizens’ credit 
records. However, state lawmakers must navigate the thicket of the 
federal Fair Credit Reporting Act’s preemption provisions if they are 
to create legislation that will be effective rather than impotent. This 
Article analyzes these provisions alongside recent Supreme Court 
decisions about preemption. The Article then provides both a theory 
of the intersection of state and federal credit reporting laws and 
describes the space remaining for state legislatures to create 
preemption-proof, or at least preemption-resistant, credit reporting 
provisions that can fairly balance the concerns of individuals and 
those who want access to their background information. 
Part II describes some recent legislative efforts in protecting 
consumers’ financial and criminal record information. Following, 
Part III sets forth the framework of federal preemption generally and 
analyzes the Supreme Court’s recent preemption decisions that are 
relevant to information-protection laws. Part IV describes the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act provisions that may overlap with state 
legislative activity, along with its specific preemption provisions, and 
analyzes the vulnerability of various state credit reporting provisions 
to preemption. The Article then maps out tactics for states to employ 
to preemption-proof their legislation and maximize the effects of 
their state information-protection laws. 
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II. STATES’ REGULATION OF DISCLOSURE OF CONSUMER 
FINANCIAL AND CRIMINAL RECORD INFORMATION 
Nearly every state regulates how consumers’ financial and 
criminal record information may be collected and disclosed; these 
are, in essence, reputation-protecting provisions. However, given 
recent developments in the economy and data technology, this may 
be a suitable time to adjust these laws to better balance the privacy 
interests of consumers against the information interests of employers, 
banks, and insurance companies. 
The Great Recession inflicted tremendous damage to credit 
records by causing widespread unemployment and depressing 
housing values, putting great stress on the ability of many to repay 
debts.1 Those defaults and delays in payment have been duly amassed 
by the consumer reporting agencies that publish credit reports about 
consumers and compute their credit scores. Seeing this information 
about those hurt by economic blows may make employers less likely 
to hire them, landlords less likely to rent to them, and insurers less 
likely to insure them (or willing to insure them, but only at 
elevated premiums). 
Aside from the economic environment, advances in data 
technology have increased our ability to view public records across 
the country, leading many to be marked by visible criminal records 
incurred even decades ago—records that many might have thought 
 
 1.  An analysis by the Fair Isaac Corporation concluded that credit scores “for 
approximately 50 million people declined more than 20 points” during the 2008–09 period. 
Rachel Bell, Recession Causes FICO Score Swings, FICO: FICOBLOG, 
http://www.fico.com/en/blogs/risk-compliance/recession-causes-fico-score-swings (last 
visited Feb. 17, 2016). Credit scores then largely rebounded in the subsequent two years. Id.; 
see also Credit Scores Drop During Recession: Are You Worried about Your Score?, ABC NEWS 
(Mar. 21, 2016), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/credit-scores-drop-millions-americans-
recession-world-news/story?id=11142553 (noting that “more than [25%] of Americans . . . 
[had a] credit score[] of 599 or lower,” in contrast to a historical norm of 15%); BARRIERS 
FACING THE LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYED: STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW 
PROJECT BEFORE THE U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON HEALTH, EDUCATION, LABOR AND 
PENSIONS, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT 8 (Dec. 6, 2011), http://www.nelp.org/page/-
/UI/2011/Owens_Testimony_Barriers_Unemployed_12-2011.pdf?nocdn=1 (reporting that 
bankruptcy filings among the unemployed rose 23% between 2008 and 2010); Jeremy Simon, 
U.S. economic recession shifted FICO credit scores (Sept. 27, 2011), 
http://blogs.creditcards.com/2011/09/economic-recession-fico-credit-scores.php (showing 
annual increases in the percent of the population with poor credit scores from 2006–09, when 
they gradually began to improve). 
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they had surpassed.2 In addition, medical costs continue to accelerate 
and medical debt not only spoils many otherwise solid credit reports 
but has also led to a significant number of bankruptcies.3 Finally, the 
crime of identity theft has increased as data breaches become more 
common, exposing sensitive financial information to thieves who can 
then poison their victims’ credit reports.4 
State legislators can ameliorate the effects of some of these 
historical events on their constituents’ opportunities, curbing the 
impact of old credit, criminal, medical, and identity theft problems. 
However, for such record-enhancing provisions to have their 
intended impact, the drafters must carefully navigate the express 
preemption provisions staked throughout the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act (FCRA), the federal statute governing the creation and use of 
credit reports.5 Furthermore, drafters must simultaneously consider 
the Supreme Court’s present stance on express and implied 
preemption. The next Section discusses some of the richest 
opportunities for legislatures to rebalance the interests of credit 
report users against the economic recovery of consumers. These 
include employers’ use of credit reports, criminal record information, 
medical debt information, and identity theft content. 
 
 2.  See Dara N. Lee, The Digital Scarlet Letter: The Effect of Online Criminal Records 
on Crime Figure 1: Timing of Online Criminal Records, 1990–2008 (May 2011) (working 
paper) (on file with the Social Science Research Network) (showing a gradual increase in states 
making criminal records available online from 1990–2008, finishing with 28 states). 
 3.  Kate Santich, Despite insurance, medical bills push family to bankruptcy, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL (July 30, 2011), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2011-07-30/health/os-
medical-bankruptcy-20110730_1_health-insurance-medical-bills-bankruptcy (describing 
trends in bankruptcies related to medical debt, and noting that “most experts interviewed said 
the problem is likely only to have worsened”); Sara R. Collins et al., Insuring the Future, 
Current Trends in Health Coverage and the Effects of Implementing the Affordable Care Act, 
COMMONWEALTH FUND xi (Apr. 2013),  
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/fund-
report/2013/apr/1681_collins_insuring_future_biennial_survey_2012_final.pdf (reporting 
that 75 million adults struggled with medical debt in 2012). 
 4.  See Lisa Gerstner, What you need to know about identity theft, CHI. TRIB., May 19, 
2013, at 12 (reporting that “about 12.6 million people” suffered identity theft in 2012, an 
increase of nearly 8% from 2011). 
 5.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2012). The preemption provisions are found in 15 
U.S.C. § 1681t. 
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A. Employer Checks of Credit Reports 
After creditors, employers may be the most visible and obvious 
users of consumer credit reports and similar background checks, 
reviewing them to peer into the past financial and other decisions of 
both current employees and applicants in order to choose and place 
their workers. According to a survey by the Society for Human 
Resource Management, in 2012 approximately thirty-four percent of 
employers reported that they conduct credit background checks on 
some potential applicants, while another thirteen percent conduct 
them on all applicants.6 
However, such information may unfairly damage an individual’s 
prospects in a few ways. First, credit and other background checks 
can be surprisingly inaccurate; a recent report by the Federal Trade 
Commission to Congress disclosed that 21 percent of credit reports 
have some sort of error in them, and 12.9 percent of the reports had 
an error sufficient that the correction changed the corresponding 
credit scores.7 When this percentage is applied to millions of reports, 
the number of consumers injured by mendacious reports is 
disquieting.8 Furthermore, even when a credit report is accurate, it 
may blacklist otherwise qualified and competent candidates from a 
job if it incorporates information that may unduly grab the attention 
of its audience. 
Several states perceive such reports to unfairly impede 
employment, and in response have enacted provisions designed to 
protect employees and job applicants from the scrutiny of a credit 
 
 6. Background Checking—The Use of Credit Background Checks in Hiring Decisions, 
SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (July 19, 2012), 
http://www.shrm.org/research/surveyfindings/articles/pages/creditbackgroundchecks.aspx. 
 7.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPORT TO CONG. UNDER SECTION 319 OF THE FAIR AND 
ACCURATE CREDIT TRANSACTIONS ACT OF 2003 iv–v (2012) (finding that 21% of the 
consumers whose reports were sampled “encounter a confirmed material error on one or more 
of their credit reports,” and noting that “[t]he estimated proportion of reports and consumers 
who experience a credit score change resulting from modification of a credit report is higher 
than previous estimates from the credit reporting industry”). For 5.2% of the consumers, the 
change in score “was such that their credit risk tier decreased and thus the consumer may be 
more likely to be offered a lower auto loan interest rate.” Id. at i. 
 8.  See Richard Cordray, Prepared Remarks by Richard Cordray on Credit Reporting, 
CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (July 16, 2012), 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/speeches/prepared-remarks-by-richard-cordray-on-credit-
reporting (stating every year “3 billion credit reports are issued”). 
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report check. California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, 
Illinois, Maryland, Nevada, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington have 
all passed credit history cloaking measures.9 Guam has also passed 
such a provision.10 Other states have considered these types of 
provisions without yet passing them.11 
The adopted measures typically prevent employers or others 
from using a credit report in connection with employment.12 Such 
restrictions far exceed those imposed by the FCRA, which permits 
employers to obtain an employee or applicant’s credit report so long 
as the target has consented.13 
The history of Maryland’s law provides a typical example of the 
impetus for such statutes; the bill’s sponsor introduced it to assist 
“blue-collar workers having trouble making ends meet, so that they 
don’t have one more hurdle to overcome.”14 A poor credit score, 
said the sponsor, does not reveal the person’s ability to perform the 
job: “Having bad credit does not make someone a bad person . . . . 
Costly medical problems, a messy divorce, and many other 
understandable reasons to have poor credit have nothing to do with 
one’s ability to do a good job.”15 Though the business and credit 
reporting communities opposed the bill when it had previously been 
 
 9.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.20.5 (2012) and CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5 (2011 & 
Supp. 2016); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-126 (2016); 7 COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 1103-4:1–1103-
4:12 (2016); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51tt (2011 & 2016 Supp.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
19, § 711(g) (2013 & Supp. 2014); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2(a)(8) (1993 & Supp. 2013); 
820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/5-70/30 (2008 & Supp. 2016); MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMP. § 3-
711 (2008 & Supp. 2015); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.570 (2013); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.320 
(2015); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495i (2009 & Supp. 2015); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
19.182.020(2)(c) (2013). 
 10.  22 GUAM PUB. L. 33-35 (2015); 22 GUAM CODE ANN. § 5201(h) (enacted June 
10, 2015), http://www.guamcourts.org/Compileroflaws/GCA/22gca/22gc005.PDF. 
 11.  See, e.g., H.P. 795, 127th Leg., 1st Sess. (Me. 2015); H. File 233, 85th Gen. 
Assemb. (Iowa 2013); S.B. 80, 188th Gen. Court. (Mass. 2013); S.B. 145, 52d Leg., 1st Sess. 
(N.M. 2015); Assemb. 1799, 236th Sess. (N.Y. 2013); Assemb. 2148, 236th Sess. (N.Y. 
2013); S.B. 699, 108th Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2013); H.B. 2532, 81st Reg. Sess. 
(W. Va. 2013). 
 12.  See infra text accompanying notes 19 to 30. 
 13.  15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b) (2012). 
 14.  Laura Bassett, Maryland Lawmaker Reintroduces Bill To Ban Credit Checks In 
Hiring Process, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 26 2011, 9:43 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/26/maryland-job-applicant-fairness-
act_n_814154.html. 
 15.  Id. 
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considered,16 the bill eventually passed in 2011 as the effects of the 
recession wore on.17 
Though employers may insist that credit reports aid their 
decision-making process, empirical data has not appeared to establish 
a material link between an employee’s credit record and that 
employee’s job performance. In considering its credit history bill, for 
example, the Oregon legislature elicited testimony from an employee 
of one of the major credit reporting agencies, TransUnion, and 
learned that the agency did not have any evidence that an employee’s 
credit history correlated with subsequent job performance, casting 
doubts on the validity of such a check.18 
Credit history-cloaking laws have some common features. In 
general, the statutes apply to similar types of information—reports 
that contain information about the applicant’s credit history19—and  
typically, they forbid employers from discriminating on the basis of 
credit information.20 The strictest laws prohibit employers from even 
obtaining a report.21 Connecticut has the weakest prohibition which 
merely bars employers from requiring an employee or applicant to 
consent to a request for a credit report—without prohibiting an 
 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  The bill, 2011 Maryland Laws Ch. 28 (S.B. 132) (H.B. 87), was passed on 
April 12,  2011. 
 18.  Economic Fairness Oregon, Testimony on Oregon’s Job Applicant Fairness Act, 
VIMEO (May 31, 2011, 3:02 PM), http://www.vimeo.com/24479508.  
 19.  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.20.5(a) (2012); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5(a) 
(2011 & Supp. 2016); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51tt(b) (2011 & Supp. 2016); 820 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 70/5 (2008 & Supp. 2016); MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMP. § 3-711(b) (2008 & 
Supp. 2015); VT. STAT. ANN. § 495i(a)(2), (3) (2009 & Supp. 2015); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 19.182.020(2)(c) (2013); 22 GUAM CIV. CODE ANN. § 5201(h) (enacted June 10, 
2015), http://www.guamcourts.org/Compileroflaws/GCA/22gca/22gc005.PDF. 
 20.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5(a) (2011 & Supp. 2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 
711(g)(1) (2013 & Supp. 2014) (applies only to public employers and during the “initial 
application process”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2(a)(8) (1993 & Supp. 2013); 820 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 70/10(a) (2008 & Supp. 2016); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 600-A(1) (2007); MD. 
CODE ANN. LAB. & EMP. § 3-711(b), (c) (2008 & Supp. 2015) (use for a non-prohibited 
purpose); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.320(1) (2015); 21 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495i(b) (2009 
& Supp. 2015); 22 GUAM CODE ANN. § 5201(h) (enacted June 10, 2015) 
http://www.guamcourts.org/Compileroflaws/GCA/22gca/22gc005.PDF. Nevada comes 
close to prohibiting the acquisition of a report, forbidding employers from inquiring 
concerning a consumer credit report. NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.570(1)–(3) (2013). 
 21.  OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.320(1) (2015); VT. STAT. ANN. § 495i(b)(2) (2009 & 
Supp. 2015) (forbidding employers from “[i]nquir[ing] about an applicant or employee’s 
credit report or credit history”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.182.020(2)(c) (2013). 
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employer from making the request, applicants might not feel free to 
deny permission.22 
Of course, these prohibitions have exceptions, some of which 
threaten to swallow the rule. For instance, most laws exempt some 
types of management positions,23 and positions involving financial 
institutions or monetary transactions,24 as well as law enforcement.25 
Certain other governmental employers are also commonly exempt.26 
 
 22.  CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51tt(b) (2011 & Supp. 2016). 
 23.  CAL. LAB. CODE 1024.5(a)(1) (2011 & Supp. 2016); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 
31-51tt(a)(4)(A) (2011 & Supp. 2016) (defining qualifying managerial positions), (C) 
(defining qualifying fiduciary positions), (b) (providing the exemption); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 26, § 600-A(2)(A) (2007) (“management of the company’s finances or a customer’s 
financial assets”); MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMP. § 3-711(c)(1)(ii) (2008 & Supp. 2015) 
(exempting positions for which the employer has a “bona fide purpose”), (c)(2)(i) (defining 
those positions for which an employer has a bona fide purpose as including specified 
managerial positions); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.580(3)(c) (2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 
495i(c)(1)(E) (2009 & Supp. 2015) (positions requiring “a financial fiduciary responsibility to 
the employer or a client of the employer”); see also HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.7(a)(1) (1993 & 
Supp. 2013) (credit history is “related to a bona fide occupational requirement” and the 
“employee has received a conditional offer of employment”), 378-2.7(a)(3) (the position is 
“managerial or supervisory”); 22 GUAM CODE ANN. § 5201(h)(2) (enacted June 10, 2015) 
http://www.guamcourts.org/Compileroflaws/GCA/22gca/22gc005.PDF (“the position is 
managerial and involves setting the direction or control of the business”). Illinois exempts 
those positions for which “a satisfactory credit history is an established bona fide occupational 
requirement,” a feature that requires the presence of at least one of seven designated 
circumstances, one of which is that the position is managerial. 820 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 70/10(b)(4). 
 24.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5(b) (2011 & Supp. 2016) (institutions covered by the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809); 1024.5(a)(5)(A)–(C) (access to bank or 
credit card information along with an individual’s date of birth and social security number, 
excluding routine credit card transactions); 1024.5(a)(6) (positions in which an employee 
would have authority over specified financial matters); 1024.5(a)(8) (positions involving 
regular access to cash totaling $10,000 or more); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51tt((b)(1) 
(2011 & Supp. 2016) (financial institutions); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.7(a)(4) (1993 & 
Supp. 2013); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/5 (excluding from the definition of “employer”); 820 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/10(b)(2)–(3) (duties of the position include “access to cash or . . . assets 
worth $2500 or more,” or “signatory power over . . . assets of $100 or more”); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 600-A(2)(B) (2007) (“employer is in the financial services industry”); 
MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMP. § 3-711(c)(2)(iii)–(iv) (2008 & Supp. 2015) (involves a 
fiduciary responsibility, including collecting payments, and for those who are provided an 
expense account or corporate debit or credit card); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.580(3)(a) (2013); 
OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.320(2)(a) (2015) (“federally insured banks or credit unions”); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495i(c)(1)(B), (C), and (G) (2009 & Supp. 2015) (“access to 
confidential financial information,” “employer is a financial institution,” or “access to an 
employer’s payroll information,” respectively); 22 GUAM CODE ANN. § 5201(h)(4), (6) 
(enacted June 10, 2015) 
http://www.guamcourts.org/Compileroflaws/GCA/22gca/22gc005.PDF (“[The] position 
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A few states weaken their general prohibitions by exempting a 
catch-all category of positions for which an employer may rely on a 
credit report, rather than limiting exemptions to specific categories. 
For instance, Oregon and Washington permit an employer to obtain 
and act upon a credit report when the report’s information is 
“substantially job-related.”27  Vermont permits employers to use 
credit reports where “[t]he employer can demonstrate that the 
information is a valid and reliable predictor of employee performance 
 
involve[s] access to customers’, employees’, or the employer’s personal or financial information 
other than information customarily provided in a retail transaction . . . , [or] includes an 
expense account.”). 
 25.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5(a)(3) (2011 & Supp. 2016); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 70/5(3) (excluding from the definition of “employer”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 
613.580(3)(d) (2013); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.320(2)(c) (2015); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 
495i(c)(1)(D) (2009 & Supp. 2015) (law enforcement, emergency medical personnel 
and firefighters). 
 26.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5(a)(2) (2011 & Supp. 2016) (for positions with the state 
department of justice); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/5(4) (where a state or local agency requires a 
credit report as a condition of employment); 70/10(b)(7) (where “[t]he employee’s . . . credit 
history is . . . required by or exempt under federal or State law”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
19.182.020(c)(2) (2013). Other typical exemptions include positions for which another law 
requires the employer to examine an applicant’s credit report, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.20.5 
(2012) (requiring the report’s user to identify a specific permissible basis) and CAL. LAB. 
CODE § 1024.5(a)(4) (2011 & Supp. 2016); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51tt(b)(2) (2011 
& Supp. 2016); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/10(b)(1) (“[s]tate or federal law requires bonding” 
of the “individual holding the position”), 70/10(b)(7) (federal or state law otherwise requires 
the employee’s credit history); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 600-A(2)(C) (2007); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 659A.320(2)(b) (2015). Some states also exempt those positions that grant the 
employee access to confidential customer or trade secret information. CAL. CIV. CODE § 
1785.20.5 (2012) (requiring the report’s user to identify a specific permissible basis) and CAL. 
LAB. CODE § 1024.5(a)(5),(7) (2011 & Supp. 2016) (providing, among other positions 
permitting the use of a report, those where the employee would have regular access to bank or 
credit card information, social security numbers, and date of birth, excluding routine credit 
card transactions, and positions with access to designated confidential or proprietary 
information); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51tt(b)(4)(E) (2011 & Supp. 2016) (access to 
customer information or confidential or proprietary business information); MD. CODE ANN. 
LAB. & EMP. 3-711(c)(2)(v) (2008 & Supp. 2015) (access to confidential business 
information); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/10(b)(5); see also 22 Guam Code Ann. § 5201(h)(3) 
(enacted June 10, 2015) 
http://www.guamcourts.org/Compileroflaws/GCA/22gca/22gc005.PDF (“[T]he position 
meets criteria in specified federal or state administrative rules to establish the circumstances 
when a credit history is a bona fide occupational requirement.”). 
 27.  OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.320(2)(d) (2015) (though requiring the employer to 
disclose its reasons for obtaining the report to the applicant or employee); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 19.182.020(c)(i) (2013). 
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in the specific position of employment.”28 Hawaii also allows some 
scrutiny of an employee’s credit history, but only once the employer 
has extended a conditional offer of employment to the target, thus 
permitting the employer to withdraw the offer only if the history is 
“directly related to a bona fide occupational qualification.”29 
Nevada’s general exception is so broad that it nearly eviscerates the 
general prohibition, allowing employers to review credit reports 
when such information is “reasonably related” to the position.30 
Notwithstanding these weakening exceptions, however, credit 
history-cloaking laws indicate a trend of increasing privacy—a 
recognition that simply because information is available does not 
necessarily mean that it should be seen or used. Such laws install 
boundaries around an individual’s financial life and implicitly 
acknowledge that employees have a sphere of existence outside of 
their employment. 
B. Criminal Record Information 
In addition to examining applicants’ credit history information, 
many employers want to know their criminal record history as well. 
One 2012 survey by the Society for Human Resource Management 
reveals that sixty-nine percent of employers investigate the criminal 
background of every applicant.31 Such public record information has 
become much more widely available; at one time, a comprehensive 
criminal background check would have required a county-by-county 
visit to clerks’ counters; now so many records are available online 
that an individual’s record can be checked from one’s own desk, or 
even from a smartphone.32 
While it seems intuitive that employers would want to know of 
any criminal taint in an applicant’s past, employee advocates worry 
that a criminal record—even a simple single record of arrest—can 
 
 28.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495i(c)(1)(F) (2009 & Supp. 2015). 
 29.  HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.7(a)(1) (1993 & Supp. 2013). 
 30.  NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.580(3) (2013). The provision designates nine types of 
duties for which “credit information shall be deemed reasonably related,” but does not provide 
that the designated duties are exclusive. Id. In addition, Nevada allows employers access to 
employee’s credit information whenever another law authorizes it. Id. § 613.580(1). 
 31.  Background Checking, supra note 6. 
 32.  Federal Trade Comm’n, FTC Warns Marketers That Mobile Apps May Violate Fair 
Credit Reporting Act (Feb. 7, 2012), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/02/mobileapps.shtm. 
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unjustifiably wall off a candidate from consideration for a position 
that does not necessarily require an unblemished background.33 For 
one thing, sheer numbers indicate that many will suffer the 
“collateral consequences” of a criminal record: 8.6 percent of 
American adults have a felony conviction, and approximately 65 
million Americans have some kind of criminal record.34 Accordingly, 
advocacy groups such as the National Employment Law Project have 
urged states to reform their employment laws to reduce the impact 
of a criminal background on an otherwise qualified applicant.35 
The FCRA—the federal act governing consumer reports—does 
not prohibit the publication of criminal convictions in credit reports 
at all.36 In contrast, the statute requires that records of arrest along 
with other “adverse item[s] of information” disappear from reports 
after seven years.37 This latter “catch-all” provision should encompass 
other criminal record information, such as indications of probation 
or parole.38 However, the FCRA lifts the seven-year limit for jobs 
that can “reasonably be expected” to draw a salary of $75,000 or 
more,39 a figure that has not risen since 1996, and likely allows 
employers to examine criminal record histories for an ever-growing 
pool of positions.40 
Unlike the FCRA, some state credit reporting statutes restrict 
agencies from putting certain non-conviction criminal record 
information into consumer reports.41 These restrictions vary widely. 
New York, with one of the more robust provisions, flatly prohibits 
agencies from reporting criminal arrest information for past charges 
unless the individual was convicted of the offense or the “charges are 
 
 33. State Reforms Reducing Collateral Consequences for People with Criminal Records: 
2011–2012 Legislative Round-Up, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, (Sept. 2012), 
http://nelp.3cdn.net/6ab3d3b51b9490b40c_cnm6b847q.pdf. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. at 1–2. 
 36.  15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(5). 
 37.  § 1681c(a)(2) (“records of arrest”); § 1681c(a)(5) ([a]ny other adverse item 
of information). 
 38.  See Russell, FTC Informal Staff Opinion Letter (Jan. 21, 1974). 
 39.  15 U.S.C. § 1681c(b)(3). 
 40.  Pub. L. No. 104-208 § 2406(a)(2), 110 Stat. 3009 (amending 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1681c(b)). 
 41.  See infra text accompanying notes 45−51. 
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still pending.”42 Furthermore, the state prohibits the reporting of 
criminal convictions more than seven years old unless an exception 
applies.43 Similarly, California prohibits not only the reporting of 
criminal record information that is more than seven years old, but 
also the reporting of any arrests, indictments, or similar information 
where no conviction followed or where the conviction was 
pardoned.44 Kentucky likewise prohibits agencies from keeping 
information about Kentucky state criminal charges unless a 
conviction resulted.45 
Nonetheless, state law exclusions of criminal record information 
are often subject to an exclusion, returning otherwise prohibited 
information to an employee’s credit report in situations similar to the 
FCRA’s salary threshold exception.46 For instance, Washington 
prohibits records of arrest, indictment, or conviction that predate the 
report by more than seven years.47 However, Washington’s statute, 
and those of New Hampshire, Maryland and Kansas, lift the cloak on 
prohibited criminal record information for jobs that could reasonably 
be expected to draw a salary of $20,000 or more.48 Thus, while the 
FCRA protects job applicants who expect to earn between $20,000 
and $75,000 from information about criminal arrests that are more 
than seven years old, these state statutes do not. Similarly, New York 
allows the continued reporting of criminal convictions where the 
user is seeking to employ the individual for an annual salary of 
$25,000 or more.49 Maine, Colorado, and Texas align themselves 
 
 42.  N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 380-j(a)(1) (McKinney 2012). The statute does permit a 
consumer reporting agency to disclose the “detention of . . . [the consumer] by a retail 
mercantile establishment” so long as he or she “has executed an uncoerced admission of 
wrongdoing,” and received a prescribed notice from the establishment. § 380-j(b). 
 43.  § 380-j(f)(1)(v). 
 44.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.13(a)(6) (2012). 
 45.  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.310 (2015). Since this provision was enacted in 1980, it 
is exempt from the FCRA preemption provision that might otherwise apply to it. See 15 
U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(E) (exempting state laws that were in effect on September 30, 1996); 
infra text accompanying notes 196 to 207 (addressing the issue of the FCRA’s preemption of 
state laws concerning criminal record information). 
 46.  See supra text accompanying notes 39−40. 
 47.  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.182.040 (2013). 
 48.  MD. CODE. ANN., COM. LAW § 14-1203(b)(3) (2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-
704(b)(3) (2005 & Supp. 2014); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 359-B:5(II)(c) (2009); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. 19.182.040(2) (2013). 
 49.  N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 380-(j)(f)(2)(iii) (McKinney 2012). 
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with the federal act, permitting criminal record reporting for those 
earning $75,000 or more.50 In contrast, Massachusetts, Montana, 
and California maintain the exclusion of criminal record information 
from consumer reports regardless of the expected salary of the 
particular employment position.51 
Some states address this issue by restricting employers, as 
opposed to restricting the contents of credit reports.52 For instance, a 
state might prohibit an employer from inquiring about an applicant’s 
criminal record until the application process has progressed to a 
particular point.53 
Notwithstanding their weaknesses, these measures display 
attempts by states to calibrate the appropriate balance between the 
privacy of an individual’s past and an employer’s legitimate interest 
in that past, revealing reasonably relevant information while cloaking 
the rest.  
C. Medical Debt Restrictions 
 While the rising impact of criminal record information on 
consumer reports likely arises from enhanced conversion of archived 
paper records to electronic ones—that is, an increase in the 
accessibility of information—the growth in the number of consumer 
credit records tarnished by medical debt may come from the 
 
 50.  COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-14.3-105.3(2)(c) (2010); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
10, § 1309 (2009 & Supp. 2015) (incorporating the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act by 
reference); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 20.05(b)(3) (2015). 
 51.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 52 (2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-3-112 
(2015); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.13 (2012). 
 52.  See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 32-13–45 (2013 & Supp. 2015) (prohibiting 
employers from inquiring about criminal convictions until after making a conditional offer of 
employment, but providing exceptions); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:6B-11–19 (2011 & Supp. 
2015) (prohibiting employers from inquiring about an applicant’s criminal record during the 
initial employment application process, or from providing in an advertisement that the 
employer will not consider applicants with criminal records, but providing exceptions); 2015 
OR. LAWS § 559 (declaring it to be an unlawful practice for an employer to “exclude an 
applicant from an initial interview solely because of a past criminal conviction” but providing 
exceptions); see also MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 10-301–06 (2010) (instituting a 
process to shield criminal record information, and prohibiting employers and educational 
institutions from requiring applicants to disclose shielded information, with exceptions). 
 53.  See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:6B-11–19 (2011 & Supp. 2015) (prohibiting 
employers from inquiring about an applicant’s criminal record during the initial employment 
application process, but providing exceptions). 
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increased financial burden that rising health care costs put on many 
Americans.54 Medical debt is one of the leading causes of 
bankruptcies in America.55 As the costs of medical care have soared 
out of proportion to the rate of inflation and as incomes at most job 
levels have remained stagnant—or have even fallen (along with 
employment rates)—Americans increasingly find themselves 
burdened with medical debt that may appear on and taint their 
credit reports.56 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) 
reported that over half of the collections tradelines on a group of 
credit reports it studied consisted of medical debt.57 Even one single 
medical bill can keep someone from receiving credit at a desirable 
rate, or perhaps from receiving credit at all.58 But no one has 
demonstrated a clear link between financial competence and medical 
debt, and it is not intuitively obvious that such a link exists, as few 
people voluntarily or frivolously take on expensive medical care. In 
fact, one study by the CFPB indicated that consumers with medical 
debt were a better risk than consumers with other sorts of debts in 
collection and that many of them “ordinarily pay their other financial 
 
 54.  See, e.g., Adrianne Kroepsch, Report Finds Medical Debt Increasing, 
COMMONWEALTH FUND (Feb. 27, 2007), 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Newsletters/Washington-Health-Policy-in-
Review/2007/Mar/Washington-Health-Policy-Week-in-Review—-March-5—-2007/Report-
Finds-Medical-Debt-Increasing.aspx. Though consumers’ share of overall spending has 
decreased, overall bills have risen because the cost of health care has been growing so quickly. 
Sarah Kliff, Patients’ share of health spending is shrinking. Yes, really, WASH. POST (Feb. 5, 
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/02/05/out-of-
pocket-health-spending-is-shrinking-yes-really/. 
 55.  One scholar testified that in 2007, 69.1% of bankruptcies included medical bills of 
$1,000 or more—a 49.6% increase in the comparable percentage from 2001. Written 
Testimony of Steffie Woolhandler Before the H. Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. on Admin. and 
Commercial Law, HOUSE.GOV (July 28, 2009), 
http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/pdf/Woolhandler090728.pdf. 
 56.  See Kathy Kristof, Getting sick can kill your credit score, CBS MONEYWATCH (May 
21, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/getting-sick-can-kill-your-credit-score/; Kate 
Santich, Medical Bills Can Bankrupt Insured, ORLANDO SENTINEL A1 (July 31, 2011). 
 57.  CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, CONSUMER CREDIT REPORTS: A STUDY 
OF MEDICAL AND NON-MEDICAL COLLECTIONS (2014), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201412_cfpb_reports_consumer-credit-medical-and-non-
medical-collections.pdf. 
 58.  See Elisabeth Rosenthal, When Health Costs Harm Your Credit, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/09/sunday-review/when-health-costs-harm-
your-credit.html?_r=0. 
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obligations on time.”59 Furthermore, errors in medical accounts are 
notoriously common,60 so people may find themselves blacklisted for 
debts that they have not actually incurred, or debts for which an 
insurance company is responsible.61 The weak relationship between 
medical debt and credit worthiness led the credit scoring company 
Fair Isaac to reduce the impact of some types of medical debt in its 
trademarked FICO credit scoring algorithm.62  
While no state prohibits outright the inclusion of medical debt in 
a consumer report or in calculating a credit score, Congress recently 
considered a bill that would have amended the FCRA to remove 
from consumer reports information regarding any medical debt that 
was eventually paid off or settled, thus clearing the usual seven year 
stickiness.63 States could consider imposing similar restrictions on 
consumer reporting agencies in order to prevent consumers’ reports 
from being hurt to a degree that is disproportionate to their actual 
willingness to pay debts. A more dramatic and helpful provision 
would be to remove medical debts from consumer reports entirely. 
D. Identity Theft Provisions 
Identity theft, an Internet-powered phenomenon, has caused 
intense misery to its hapless victims, who may find themselves 
 
 59.  CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, supra note 57 at 7, 38. 
 60.  Estimates of errors in medical bills range from 30% to 80%. Jessica Silver-
Greenberg, How to Fight a Bogus Bill, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 19, 2011), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703312904576146371931841968. 
 61.  See CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, supra note 57, at 39–42 (describing 
the complexity and lack of transparency of medical costs, insurance coverage, and the 
billing process). 
 62.  See FICO Score 9 Introduces Refined Analysis of Medical Collections, FICO (Aug. 7, 
2014), http://www.fico.com/en/about-us/newsroom/news-releases/fico-score-9-
introduces-refined-analysis-medical-collections/ (“This will help ensure that medical 
collections have a lower impact on the score, commensurate with the credit risk they 
represent.”). This adaptation reveals that legislation may not be the only source of relief to 
consumers struggling to borrow in the face of existing medical debt. Another source may be 
software such as FICO Score 9. 
 63.  S. 160, The Medical Debt Responsibility Act of 2013 § 3, 113th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(2013) (proposing an amendment to 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a), the obsolescence provision 
described supra, that would delete from credit reports “[a]ny information related to a fully 
paid or settled medical debt that had been characterized as delinquent, charged off, or in 
collection which, from the date of payment or settlement, antedates the report by more than 
45 days”). 
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shadowed by a pernicious doppelganger whose spendthrift records 
cannot be purged from their credit histories. The Federal Trade 
Commission reported that it received 490,220 complaints about 
identity theft in 2015, up 47 percent from 2014.64 Fundamentally, 
the relationship between identity theft and a credit report is one of 
inaccuracy. To illustrate, once a thief obtains goods, credit, or 
services in the identity theft victim’s name and then fails to pay for 
them, the lender wrongly ascribes the debt to the victim of the theft, 
rather than to the thief. The debt shows up not on the thief’s credit 
report, but on the victim’s credit report. 
States have been contending with the rising impact of identity 
theft on consumers’ credit reports. As an example, New Mexico 
enacted a statute that sought to allow identity theft victims to block 
a thief’s debt from appearing on their credit reports. Under this law, 
once a consumer reporting agency receives a proper notice from an 
identity theft victim identifying information reported to or by the 
consumer reporting agency that is the product of identity theft, the 
agency must remove that information from the victim’s file.65 The 
agency may restore the information only if the consumer requests it 
or if ordered by a court after adjudicating the alleged debt.66 The 
provision significantly overlaps with one in the federal FCRA, but 
the federal statute gives consumer reporting agencies a good deal 
more leeway to decline to block an identity theft debt.67 The FCRA 
permits a consumer reporting agency to decline to block an item of 
information sua sponte if it determines that (A) the agency 
mistakenly blocked it, (B) the consumer misrepresented a material 
fact about the information, or (C) the consumer obtained goods, 
services, or money as a result of the blocked transaction.68 The 
agency’s right to act unilaterally can eviscerate the protection the 
provision intends to give to identity theft victims. 
 
 64.  FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, CONSUMER SENTINEL NETWORK DATA BOOK FOR 
JANUARY–DECEMBER 2015, 6, 82 (2016), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/consumer-sentinel-network-data-
book-january-december-2015/160229csn-2015databook.pdf. 
 65.  N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 56-3A-2(D), 56-3A-3.1(A), (D) (2010). 
 66.  § 56-3A-3.1(E) (2010). 
 67.  15 U.S.C. § 1681c-2(c). 
 68.  § 1681c-2(c)(1)(A)–(C). 
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Thus, these four areas of concern—(i) employer use of consumer 
reports, (ii) criminal record information in consumer reports, (iii) 
medical debt in consumer reports, and (iv) the effects of identity 
theft on consumer reports—are fertile for state intervention in order 
to protect citizens from the disproportionate consequences of their 
failures. However, state legislation must avoid preemption by the 
federal Fair Credit Reporting Act in order to be effective. The 
following section discusses general principles of preemption and 
analyzes some of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in the area 
of preemption. 
III. THE THREE VARIETIES OF PREEMPTION AND THE SUPREME 
COURT’S RECENT PREEMPTION DECISIONS 
The Supreme Court has taken up the issue of preemption in a 
fistful of cases over the last several years. These cases will guide the 
preemptive effect of the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act on state 
innovations intended to improve the privacy of their citizens’ 
historical records. 
As a basic matter, the Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution is the mechanism that elevates federal laws over state 
laws. The second clause of Article VI provides that the laws of the 
United States “shall be the supreme Law of the Land; . . . any Thing 
in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.” Obviously, federal and state laws can peacefully 
co-exist—our system encourages simultaneous federal and state 
authority.69 As just one example, the federal government protects 
consumers against unfair and deceptive trade practices through the 
Federal Trade Commission Act,70 while states do so through similar 
state laws.71 Nonetheless, under limited circumstances, federal law 
will neutralize an overlapping state law. This phenomenon by which 
federal law supersedes overlapping state laws is called preemption. 
 
 69.  Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500 (2012) (“Federalism, central to 
the constitutional design, adopts the principle that both the National and State Governments 
have elements of sovereignty the other is bound to respect.”). 
 70.  15 U.S.C. § 45. 
 71.  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750–1785 (2012); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 510/1–
510/7 (2015); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 349-50-f-1 (McKinney 2015). 
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Preemption occurs in three basic varieties: (i) field, (ii) express, 
and (iii) implied. Of these, it can be argued that express preemption 
most influences the viability of state credit reporting restrictions.   
A. Field Preemption: “[S]o pervasive . . . or so dominant”72 
Field preemption preempts the most extensively; it clears an 
entire subject area from state regulation, reserving it for federal 
dominion.73 There are two types of field preemption. The first 
measures breadth and allows federal law to override any state law in 
the same field where the federal law’s framework is “so pervasive” it 
leaves no room for state regulation.74 The second measures intensity 
and occurs when the federal interest is “so dominant that the federal 
system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the 
same subject.”75 For instance, anti-sedition is one area the Supreme 
Court has found subject to field preemption.76 
B. Express Preemption: “[A] fair but narrow reading”77 
While field preemption can exist without any action by Congress, 
express preemption arises only when Congress plants specific 
language in a federal act to target state legislation.78 Even though the 
language may be explicit, however, courts must still construe it when 
evaluating its impact on a specific state provision, which raises the 
question of how they should do so: broadly, narrowly, or somewhere 
in between. 
 
 72.  Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
 73.  See, e.g., Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1595, 1599 (2015) 
(describing field preemption as arising when “Congress may have intended ‘to foreclose any 
state regulation in the area,’ irrespective of whether state law is consistent or inconsistent with 
‘federal standards,’” and holding that the federal Natural Gas Act did not preempt state 
antitrust lawsuits) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
 74.  Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501. 
 75.  Id.; see also Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 488 (2008) (holding that 
the Clean Water Act’s penalties for water pollution did not preempt maritime common law on 
punitive damages, stating that “we see no clear indication of congressional intent to occupy the 
entire field of pollution remedies”). 
         76.   Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504 (1956). 
 77.  Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 80 (2008). 
 78.  See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2500. 
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The Supreme Court recently examined express preemption in 
the 2013 decision of Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey,79 an action 
that pitted a consumer whose car had been towed and sold without 
his consent against a federal law that the defendant, the towing 
authority, asserted barred any state claim by the consumer. This 
decision followed three significant 2008 decisions about express 
preemption: Altria Group, Inc. v. Good,80 Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.,81 
and Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transp. Ass’n.82 Taken together, 
the four cases illustrate that so long as the federal provision leaves 
some space for states to occupy, the Court is willing to allow states 
to fill that area. 
Examining the opinion reveals first that an express preemption 
provision that preempts state laws “with respect to” a designated 
area that federal law regulates will receive a compact reading.83 In 
Dan’s City, the unhappy former car owner sued the towing company 
under a state consumer protection law that prescribed specific 
procedures for the storage and sale of a towed vehicle, procedures 
that he alleged the towing company failed to comply with.84 The 
defendant relied on a preemption provision of the Federal Aviation 
Administration Authorization Act (known by the ungainly acronym 
“FAAAA”), which appeared to reach broadly into state domains. 
This provision stated that “a State . . . may not enact or enforce a 
law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law 
related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . with 
respect to the transportation of property.”85 
The phrase “related to” reflects “a broad pre-emptive purpose.”86 
Nevertheless, the Court held that even such a broad phrase “does 
not mean the sky is the limit;” it “does not preempt state laws 
affecting carrier prices, routes, and services ‘in only a “tenuous, 
remote, or peripheral . . . manner.”87 The Court cautioned that the 
 
 79.  133 S. Ct. 1769 (2013). 
 80.  555 U.S. 70 (2008). 
 81.  552 U.S. 312 (2008). 
 82.  552 U.S. 364 (2008). 
 83.  See Altria, 555 U.S. at 80–81. 
 84.  133 S. Ct. at 1775; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 262:36-a (2014). 
 85.  49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 86.  Dan’s City, 133 S. Ct. at 1778. 
 87.  Id. (quoting Rowe, 552 U.S. at 371). 
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“related to” language could not have too broad and literal an effect, 
else “‘for all practical purposes pre-emption would never run its 
course.’”88 In this particular provision, the “related to” language was 
further limited by the phrase “with respect to the transportation of 
property.”89 In determining the effect of the language, the Court 
focused on the different time periods involved. The federal Act 
addressed the period in which a particular vehicle was transported 
and stored, while the plaintiff ’s state law claims addressed not the 
transport of the car, but the period of sale—well after the car had 
been towed. This distinction maintained the vitality of the state 
statutory scheme related to the sale of towed cars as well as the state 
common law bailment claims.90 
To check its analysis, the Court examined the purpose behind 
Congress’s enactment of the Act’s preemption provision, and 
concluded that the state law claims would not in any way interfere 
with that purpose, which was to prevent states from “constrain[ing] 
participation in interstate commerce.”91 
The preference for reading broad preemption language narrowly 
reflected in Dan’s City also prevailed in Altria. The state statute in 
question was Maine’s Unfair Trade Practices Act,92 whose primary 
express preemption provision provided as follows: “No requirement 
or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under 
State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any 
cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the 
provisions of this chapter.”93 The petitioners—cigarette 
manufacturers—alleged that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and 
 
 88.  Id. (quoting N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers 
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995)). 
 89.  49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). 
 90.  Dan’s City, 133 S. Ct. at 1779. 
 91.  Id. at 1780. In that same term, the Supreme Court construed this preempting 
provision of the FAAAA and concluded that it preempted a local requirement regarding 
placard and parking. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of L.A., 133 S. Ct. 2096, 2104 (2013). 
There, however, the issue was not whether the requirement related, as a substantive matter, to 
“a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of 
property,” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1), but rather whether the requirement “ha[d] the force and 
effect of law.’” Id. at 2102, 2104. 
 92.  Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 72 (2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 
207 (Supp. 2008). 
 93.  15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2012) (emphasis added). 
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Advertising Act preempted the respondents’ claims under the state 
statute.94 The respondents were users of petitioners’ “light” 
cigarettes who brought a state law unfair trade practices claim in 
response to advertisements that claimed the “light” cigarettes passed 
less tar and nicotine to consumers than regular cigarettes95—the 
respondents alleged that the manufacturers knew that this was not 
so.96 The manufacturers rebutted that the Labeling Act’s express 
preemption provision preempted the state statute and therefore 
barred the smokers’ claims.97 
Thus, the question was whether the Maine Unfair Trade 
Practices Act, when applied to challenge the “light” cigarette 
advertisement, constituted a state law “based on smoking and 
health . . . with respect to the advertising or promotion of any 
cigarettes . . . .”98 The Court construed the phrase “based on 
smoking and health” as modifying the state law taken as a whole, as 
opposed to the particular application of the law.99 Thus, the Court 
stepped back from the context of the immediate application of the 
state law and looked at the law itself—was it one “based on smoking 
and health”? The Court reasoned that the clause should be given “‘a 
fair but narrow reading.’”100 The Act said nothing about either 
“smoking” or “health,”101 but rather targeted deceptive statements 
that induced the respondents to buy the petitioners’ cigarettes, 
imposing a general duty not to deceive, rather than one bound to 
smoking and health.102 Thus, the express preemption provision did 
not preempt an action under a state’s general deceptive trade 
practices statute.103 
 
 94.  Altria, 555 U.S. at 72. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. at 80–88. The manufacturers also argued that the state law was preempted 
under a theory of implied obstacle preemption. Id. at 88–90. This aspect of Altria is discussed 
infra in Section II.B. 
 98.  15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2012). 
 99.  555 U.S. at 80. 
 100.  Id. (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 524 (1992)). 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. at 82–83. 
 103.  Id. at 87 (“In sum, we conclude now, as the plurality did in Cipollone, that ‘the 
phrase “based on smoking and health” fairly but narrowly construed does not encompass the 
more general duty not to make fraudulent statements.’”). 
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However, in two other recent express preemption cases, the 
Court concluded that the federal statute’s preemption provision did 
in fact squelch the state law at issue.104 From these cases we discern 
first that a federal law that targets state “requirements” and 
“prohibitions” extends to state common law torts in addition to 
state statutes. Second, the Court will examine the policies behind the 
federal law and the overlapping state law and will be more likely to 
find preemption when those policies promote different goals. In 
addition, the Court has indicated that it will honor specific 
boundaries, even if they cover a broad expanse, and will find 
preempted even generally applicable common law.105 
An expansive preemption provision written in concrete terms will 
be given expansive preemption power. In Riegel v. Medtronic, the 
Court construed the express preemption provision of the federal 
Medical Device Amendments Act (MDA).106 This provision was 
quite broad, providing that a state shall not apply to the device “any 
requirement . . . which is different from, or in addition to, any 
requirement applicable” under federal law.107 In effect, this provision 
left room for the states to enact only an identical twin of the 
federal provision. 
Riegel’s petitioners, a husband and wife, sued the manufacturer 
of a catheter under state strict liability, negligence, and similar laws 
after the device ruptured.108 First, the Court concluded that the 
FDA’s premarket approval process imposed “requirements” under 
the MDA, activating the statute’s preemption provision.109 Thus, the 
next question was whether the state’s common law claim was a 
“requirement . . . different from, or in addition to” that premarket 
approval. Common law duties are, the Court concluded, 
“requirements” for purposes of an express preemption provision.110 
 
 104.  Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364 (2008); Riegel v. 
Medtronic, 552 U.S. 312 (2008). 
 105.  See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 312. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  21 U.S.C. § 360k(a). 
 108.  552 U.S. at 319–21. 
 109.  Id. at 322. 
 110.  Id. at 324. The Court reasoned, “Congress is entitled to know what meaning this 
Court will assign to terms regularly used in its enactments.” Id. The Court had previously 
interpreted a federal preemption provision’s use of “requirements” as including state common 
law duties. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 
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The petitioners, unfortunately, failed to pursue an argument that 
their state law claims nonetheless survived as requirements that were 
simply parallel to, as opposed to different from or in addition to that 
of the federal law, and thus lost their case once the Court concluded 
that their claims constituted “requirements.”111 
Even where an express preemption provision is less expansive, 
preemption becomes more likely when the federal and state laws 
have fundamentally different purposes and the state law’s purpose 
coincides with the motivation behind the federal law’s express 
preemption provision. In Rowe v. New Hampshire Transport Ass’n,112 
the Court examined the preemption language of the Federal 
Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994,113 the same 
statute that the Court addressed five years later in Dan’s City.114 The 
language of the preemption provision was as follows: “a State . . . 
may not enact or enforce a law . . . related to a price, route, or 
service of any motor carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of 
property.”115 Maine, hoping to cut back on minors’ use of tobacco, 
had enacted two provisions that imposed specific requirements for 
the transport and delivery of tobacco products.116 The federal statute 
 
518 U.S. 470 (1996); Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992). The Court 
rejected the petitioners’ argument that even if common law duties were “requirements,” they 
were not requirements “with respect to devices,” reasoning that the statutory text did not 
“suggest[] that the pre-empted state requirement must apply only to the relevant device . . . .” 
Riegel, 552 U.S. at 328; see also Premium Mortg. Corp. v. Equifax, Inc., 583 F.3d 103, 106 
(2d Cir. 2009) (construing the language of an FCRA preemption provision, 15 U.S.C. § 
1681t(b), that referred to a “requirement or prohibition” under state law as encompassing 
common law claims as well as statutory claims). 
 111.  Riegel, 552 U.S. at 330. 
 112.  552 U.S. 364 (2008). 
 113.  49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) (2005). 
 114.  Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 133 S. Ct. 1769, 1778 (2013); see supra text 
accompanying notes 84 to 91. 
 115.  49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). 
 116.  The first, imposing two requirements, forbade anyone other than a state-licensed 
tobacco retailer from accepting an order for tobacco delivery, and required licensed retailers 
accepting and shipping tobacco orders to use a delivery service that verifies the identity of the 
recipient. Rowe, 552 U.S. at 368 (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1555-C(1), C(3)(C) 
(2003). The second forbade any person from knowingly transporting a tobacco product to a 
person unless either the sender or the receiver had a Maine license, and designated 
circumstances as deeming knowledge. Id. at 369 (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1555-
D (2003)). These circumstances included those where “‘the package is marked as containing 
tobacco and displays the name and license number of a Maine-licensed tobacco retailer’” or 
the receipt of “‘the package from someone whose name appears on a list of un-licensed 
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was designed to expand interstate trucking commerce by 
deregulating it; in contrast, the state law was designed to improve 
public health. Thus, there were two objectives in tension, at least in 
this instance. 
The respondents in Rowe, transport associations affected by the 
state laws, challenged them, arguing that the federal act’s express 
preemption provision nullified the state laws.117 In an earlier decision, 
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., the Court had interpreted 
similar preemptive language as applying to state enforcement actions 
in connection with “‘rates, routes, or services’” even where the state 
law only indirectly affected those attributes.118 Reasoning from 
Morales, the Rowe court concluded that the two Maine laws not only 
had a direct “connection with” motor carrier services, but that the 
provisions would have a “‘significant’ and adverse ‘impact’ in respect 
of the federal Act’s ability to achieve its pre-emption-related 
objectives,” thus dooming the state laws.119 The Court also declined 
to create a “public health objective” exception to the preemption 
provision, though Maine tried to distinguish its laws from the sort of 
economic regulation it argued Congress had intended to preempt.120 
The federal law in Rowe was unusual because it sought to deregulate, 
rather than regulate—to clear the table of restrictions on trucking, 
whether federal or state. Thus, Maine’s laws—clearly directed 
towards imposing extra burdens on the trucking industry—directly 
undermined Congress’s free market intent.121 
The next case to interpret this provision of the Federal Aviation 
Administration Authorization Act was Dan’s City, described supra, 
which permitted rather than preempted a state law.122 The difference 
between Rowe and Dan’s City lies in the strength of the link between 
the subject of the state law involved and “a price, route, or service of 
any motor carrier.”123 The state law in Dan’s City related to events 
 
tobacco retailers that Maine’s attorney general distributes to various package-delivery 
companies.’” Id. (emphasis in the opinion). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992). 
 119. 552 U.S. at 371–73. 
 120. Id. at 374. 
 121. Id. at 371–72. 
 122.  Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 133 S. Ct. 1769 (2013). 
 123. 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) (2012). 
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after the transportation of a vehicle, a time period distinctly 
subsequent to the time period with which the federal law was 
concerned—the transporting period.124 That link was too weak to 
bring the state law into the orbit of the preemption provision.125 
So, taken collectively, Dan’s City, Altria, Riegel, and Rowe 
indicate that a state is more likely to successfully avoid preemption 
when the state law imposes a general duty, rather than an area-
specific law, and that courts will honor broad but specific boundary-
setting and Congress’s motivation for including the 
preemption provision. 
C. Implied Preemption: “Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-
law causes of action”126 
Even where a federal law does not seek to pervade a field of 
regulation, and does not contain an express preemption provision, it 
can still preempt an overlapping state law through implied 
preemption. While field preemption removes an entire arena from 
state regulation, implied preemption removes only those state laws 
that conflict with a specific federal law.127 Such a conflict can arise in 
two ways. First, implied preemption negates a state law when 
“compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical 
impossibility,” known as implied impossibility preemption.128 Second, 
a state law must give way to a federal one where it “stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes 
 
 124. Dan’s City, 133 S. Ct. at 1779. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996). 
 127. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1981 (2011); see also Wos v. 
E.M.A. ex rel. Johnson, 133 S. Ct. 1391, 1398 (2013) (“‘Where state and federal law directly 
conflict,’ state law must give way.”) (citations omitted). 
 128. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963); see also 
Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1950 (2013) (describing the doctrine). 
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and objectives of Congress,”129 undermining a policy that the federal 
law promotes. This is known as implied obstacle preemption.130 
The Court’s recent implied preemption cases reflect a great deal 
of deference to state schemes, so long as the area is not one that 
Congress had pervasively regulated, leading to field preemption. The 
Court is fond of quoting the purpose presumption: “[i]n preemption 
analysis, courts should assume that ‘the historic police powers of the 
States’ are not superseded ‘unless that was the clear and manifest 
purpose of Congress.’”131 
This presumption places a thumb on the scale in favor of leaving 
state laws intact. For instance, in Wyeth v. Levine, a 2009 case of 
implied preemption, the plaintiff brought a state failure to warn 
claim arising from a method of administering an anti-nausea drug.132 
The federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) did not contain 
an express preemption clause relevant to prescription drugs.133 
However, the defendant, the drug’s manufacturer, argued that the 
FDCA preempted the state law claim under two theories. First, the 
defendant argued that it was impossible to comply with both the 
state’s warning requirements and the FDCA. The defendant’s second 
theory was that the FDCA created an obstacle such that complying 
with state law would obstruct the purposes and objectives of the 
federal drug labeling regulation. The Court rejected both 
arguments: “We rely on the presumption because respect for the 
States as ‘independent sovereigns in our federal system’ leads us to 
assume that ‘Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes 
 
 129. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); see also Hillman, 133 S. Ct. at 1950 
(describing the doctrine); Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 493–94 (1987) (stating 
that “the Court must be guided by the goals and policies of [a federal act],” and concluding 
that a federal law preempts if a state law claim would “serious[ly] interfere[] with the 
achievement of the ‘full purposes and objectives of Congress’” or “with the methods by which 
the federal statute was designed to reach” its goals) (citation omitted). 
 130. Thus, even without the express preemptive language in the federal statute at issue in 
Rowe, Maine’s trucking laws might well have fallen to implied preemption. See Danforth v. 
Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 271–72 (2008) (noting the conflict between the state’s objectives 
and congressional intent). 
 131. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe 
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) 
(quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485). 
 132. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 565. 
 133. Id. at 567. 
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of action.’”134 Recent Supreme Court decisions on both implied 
impossibility preemption and implied obstacle preemption are 
discussed infra. 
1. Implied impossibility preemption 
Implied impossibility preemption arises under fairly narrow 
circumstances where a regulated entity cannot comply with one 
sovereign’s law without simultaneously violating that of the other.  
Where a regulated entity does not maintain full control over all 
contingencies needed to comply with the federal law, state law, or 
both, the implied impossibility preemption doctrine will likely block 
the state law, even in the absence of an actual conflict. The Supreme 
Court recently nullified state law claims on the grounds of implied 
impossibility by construing “impossible” broadly.135 In PLIVA, Inc. v. 
Mensing, two patients were prescribed a generic form of a 
prescription drug that the defendants manufactured, and then 
subsequently developed a serious neurological disorder known to be 
associated with the drug.136 They sued under their respective states’ 
tort laws for damages, claiming that the manufacturers should have 
warned of the dangers of developing the condition for patients 
taking the medication for more than twelve weeks.137 The 
preemption issue arose because Congress imposed slightly different 
federal drug labeling duties on generic drug manufacturers than on 
brand name drug manufacturers.138 Under FDA regulations, a 
generic drug manufacturer could acquire approval by showing that 
its warning label was the same as the brand name manufacturer’s 
label.139 Under state law, the manufacturers had to “adequately and 
safely label their products.”140 
 
 134. Id. at 565 n.3 (quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485). 
 135. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011). 
 136. Id. at 2572–73. 
 137. Id. at 2573. 
 138. Id. at 2574. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 2577. The issue was whether the FDA’s regulations permitted the generic 
drug manufacturers to update their warning labels in a way that would meet the state law’s 
requirements of “warning of [known] dangers,” (Minnesota’s law), or of “provid[ing] 
adequate instructions for safe use of a product.” Id. at 2573. 
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Of course, new information could require a new warning under 
either the state or the federal law. However, the Court construed the 
FDA’s regulations as prohibiting a unilateral change; only with the 
FDA’s cooperation could the manufacturer have updated the label to 
warn of the dangers associated with the neurological condition that 
the plaintiffs had acquired; these dangers were discovered only after 
the FDA approved the original label.141 In other words, because the 
ability to change a label was not within the manufacturer’s sole 
control, the manufacturer could no longer be absolutely certain of 
complying with both the federal and the state law. Since the only way 
the manufacturer could have guaranteed that its labels would comply 
with state law would be to have unilaterally changed them—an act 
that would have violated federal law—the Court reasoned that the 
doctrine of implied impossibility preemption applied to block the 
state law claims. 
Furthermore, if the ability to comply with the dual systems 
would require the regulated party to abandon the regulated activity, 
that party can claim impossibility and thus trigger preemption, 
annulling the state law.142 Subsequent to PLIVA, in the 2013 case of 
Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, the Supreme Court reviewed 
the labeling law involved in PLIVA and permitted a manufacturer to 
claim that it could not possibly comply with a state tort duty to warn 
of unreasonable dangers of a generic drug while also acceding to a 
federal law’s requirement that it warn of only those dangers that the 
brand-name equivalent manufacturer had attached to that product’s 
label.143 The Court thus vacated a judgment for a woman whose skin 
had burned off as a side effect of a generic drug that had not 
explicitly warned of the known risk of the syndrome that befell her.144 
The Court specifically rejected the First Circuit’s reasoning that the 
generic drug manufacturer could have complied with both the state 
and federal drug laws by simply ceasing to sell the generic drug, 
reasoning that the Court’s past preemption decisions did not allow 
 
 141. Id. at 2578. 
 142. See Mutual Pharm. Co., v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013). 
 143. Id. at 2470–72. 
 144. Id. at 2476. 
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for that sort of leave-the-market solution and noting that it had not 
used that rationale to escape preemption in PLIVA.145  
Thus, the Court’s recent impossibility preemption cases indicate 
that if the ability to comply with both state and federal law hinged 
on a contingency outside the defendant’s exclusive control, the 
federal law would preempt the state law. This preemption would 
occur even if the defendant had partial control over the contingency 
and even if the contingency were likely to fall in favor of compliance; 
the defendant need not seek to resolve the conflict by withdrawing 
from the market. 
2. Implied obstacle preemption 
Federal law will also trump a state law that “stands as an obstacle 
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress.”146 This is known as implied 
obstacle preemption.  
Sometimes a state law will parallel a federal one, but will provide 
a remedy that the federal law lacks, sprouting the question of 
whether the federal claim—and its lack of a remedy—should bar the 
consumer from recovering. The absence of a federal remedy does not 
necessarily indicate that Congress wanted to leave consumers 
without any remedy, and may in fact indicate that it expected 
consumers to pursue remedies under state law. For instance, in 
concluding that the FDCA did not bar an injured plaintiff ’s state 
failure to warn claim in Wyeth v. Levine, the Court considered the 
preference for consumers to have remedies.147 It reasoned that 
Congress’s choice not to provide a federal remedy for consumers 
harmed by unsafe or ineffective drugs indicated that Congress 
thought “widely available state rights of action provided appropriate 
relief for injured consumers.”148 Further, the Court saw great 
significance in Congress’s choice to enact an express preemption 
provision for medical devices, but not for prescription drugs.149 Thus, 
 
 145. Id. As one dissenting opinion noted, the Court’s majority opinion curiously omitted 
any reference to the purpose presumption. Id. at 2483 n.1 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 146. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
 147. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 574 (2009). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
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the absence of an express preemption provision can indicate 
“Congress [did not think] state lawsuits posed an obstacle to its 
objectives.”150 The federal agency’s practices also favored preserving 
state law, given that the FDA “traditionally regarded state law as a 
complementary form of drug regulation. The FDA has limited 
resources to monitor the 11,000 drugs on the market . . . .”151 
Therefore, state laws could help shore up the FDA’s regulation of 
drugs, presenting a promotion of rather than an obstacle to the 
federal government’s goals. 
As noted supra, the petitioners in Altria—cigarette 
manufacturers fighting a state deceptive practices act claim arising 
from their advertising their cigarettes as “light”—advanced an 
implied preemption argument in addition to the express preemption 
one.152 The Court concluded that the state deceptive trade practices 
statute was not impliedly preempted by virtue of “present[ing] an 
obstacle to a longstanding policy of the FTC,” the federal agency 
charged with administering the federal Labeling Act.153 The Court 
reviewed the agency’s guidance and consent orders and concluded 
that no relevant longstanding policy existed. Thus, it appears that the 
Court assesses claims of implied obstacle preemption skeptically, 
perhaps reluctant to find preemption where Congress did not 
include an express preemption provision and where the target of the 
dual laws can in fact comply with both.  
In summary, where a state wants to regulate an area that the 
federal government has penetrated, it should evaluate the potential 
for preemption by any existing federal provision in the regulated 
area. If the area is one that the federal government has penetrated 
pervasively, the state law may fall to field preemption. If a federal law 
has express preemption language, the state law may nonetheless be 
able to intercede in the gaps of the preemption provision, especially 
in areas traditionally within states’ purview, given that the 
preemption provision should receive a narrow construction. 
Nonetheless, where the purpose behind the preemption provision 
conflicts with the state’s regulation, the preemption provision may 
 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 578. 
 152. Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 87 (2008). 
 153. Id. at 89–90. 
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well be construed to encompass, and therefore nullify, the state law. 
Finally, state provisions that clear field and express preemption must 
still overcome any implied preemption. In implied preemption 
contests, however, states will benefit from the purpose presumption, 
which favors preserving the state law. 
The next question is what the preemption doctrine means in 
relation to state efforts to restrict the information available in 
consumers’ credit reports, specifically information related to adverse 
credit history when evaluated for employment, criminal background 
information, and medical information, as well as identity theft debris. 
IV. SURMOUNTING THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT’S BARRIERS 
Taken together, the Court’s recent preemption decisions 
generally bode well for preserving state claims. First, field 
preemption will not preclude states from intervening to protect 
consumer financial information. Congress has quite clearly not taken 
over this area, given that the Fair Credit Reporting Act—the premier 
piece of federal legislation in this area—expressly evinces room for 
state action.154 Nonetheless, the FCRA presents express and implied 
preemption challenges for states. 
The Sections below provide a brief description of the FCRA and 
an extended discussion of its various preemption provisions, along 
with a summary of the case law construing those provisions. 
Subsequently, the likelihood that the various types of state 
reputation-protecting legislation identified supra would prevail 
against a challenge of preemption—given the Supreme Court’s 
decisions along with the role and provisions of the FCRA—
is discussed.  
A. The FCRA 
The FCRA provides the primary federal control over consumer 
reports, and it conveys conflicting and complex messages about the 
role of state law in regulating consumer credit reports. It creates a 
federal regulatory scheme for consumer reports, yet explicitly 
recognizes state law by providing a general rule that such laws are 
preserved. Nonetheless, it claims a monopoly over certain fields 
 
 154. 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(a) (2012); see infra text accompanying notes 159 to 161. 
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within the territory of consumer report regulation, identifying 
specific kinds of state laws that must yield to the federal Act. These 
types of state laws vary by the degree to which they relate to their 
corresponding federal provisions. After accounting for those 
monopolized areas, however, the FCRA still leaves substantial room 
for states to act, preserving a number of fields in which states can 
enact legislation to accord more weight to their citizens’ privacy. 
1. Overall scheme 
The FCRA regulates “consumer reports,” also commonly known 
as credit reports, although the definition clearly covers reports 
describing matters other than mere credit. A “consumer report” 
“means any written, oral, or other communication of any 
information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a 
consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, 
character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of 
living” where that information is “used or expected to be used or 
collected” for, among other purposes, “the consumer’s eligibility for 
employment.”155 A “consumer reporting agency” includes “any 
person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit 
basis, regularly engages . . . in the practice of assembling or 
evaluating consumer credit information or other information on 
consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third 
parties . . . .”156 Thus, this definition covers everything from the 
standard big three consumer reporting agencies of Trans Union, 
Experian, and Equifax to specialty agencies like tenant screening 
agencies157 and the medical information data aggregator MIB.158 
 
 155.  15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1) (emphasis added). This article focuses on reports that 
qualify as “consumer reports” under the FCRA. Legislation governing reports that do not fall 
within this definition would face far fewer preemption concerns. See § 1681t. 
 156.  § 1681a(f). The definition includes an interstate commerce nexus as well. Id. 
 157.  For example, Tenant Background Search, which advertises that it can help a 
landlord “[v]erify your applicant’s identity and credit, and search for a criminal background 
before you rent. Tenant Background Search is the leader in providing high quality tenant 
credit check and tenant background check services.” Order Now, TENANT BACKGROUND 
SEARCH, https://www.tenantbackgroundsearch.com/tenantScreening.aspx (last visited Mar. 
23, 2016). 
 158.  See MIB.COM, http://www.mib.com/index.html (describing MIB’s services) (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2016). 
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Looked at broadly, the FCRA imposes responsibilities not just on 
consumer reporting agencies, but also on the users who buy 
consumer reports from agencies and the furnishers who feed 
information about consumers to the agencies. 
2. General rule of non-preemption 
By its express language, the FCRA provides a general rule that 
the Act does not preempt state law claims: 
Except as provided in subsections (b)159 and (c)160 . . . , [the FCRA] 
does not annul, alter, affect, or exempt any person subject to the 
provisions of this [title] from complying with the laws of any State 
with respect to the collection, distribution, or use of any 
information on consumers or for the prevention or mitigation of 
identity theft, except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent 
with any provision of this [title] . . . and then only to the extent of 
the inconsistency.161 
This explicit acknowledgement of the states’ interest eliminates 
pervasive field preemption.162 Furthermore, that same 
acknowledgement shows that the federal regulation does not have 
the dominance that would lead to field preemption.163 Accordingly, 
 
 159.  Providing exceptions. 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b). See infra text accompanying notes 
166 to 176. 
 160.  Defining the term “firm offer of credit or insurance” for purposes of both federal 
and state law. 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b). 
 161.  § 1681t(a). This general preemption standard indicates that Congress did not 
intend to comprehensively preempt states from the field of credit reporting regulation. See 
Davenport v. Farmers Ins. Group, 378 F.3d 839, 842 (8th Cir. 2004); Credit Data of Ariz., 
Inc. v. Arizona, 602 F.2d 195, 197 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 162.  See supra text accompanying note 74; see also Davenport, 378 F.3d at 842 (stating 
that this provision demonstrates that Congress did not intend to preempt the field of claims 
and upholding against a challenge of preemption a state insurance statute that regulated 
behavior not covered by the FCRA); Credit Data of Ariz., 602 F.2d at 197 (upholding against 
a challenge of preemption a state statute that required consumer reporting agencies to provide 
free reports, a provision that predated the FCRA’s present free report provisions in 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1681j(a)(1)); State Dep’t of Commerce, Community, & Econ. Dev., Div. of Ins. v. 
Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 165 P.3d 624, 626–27 (Alaska 2007) (upholding against a challenge 
of preemption a state law that forbade insurers from failing to renew a personal insurance 
policy “based in whole or in part on a consumer’s credit history or insurance score” without 
the consumer’s consent). But see Consumer Data Indus. Ass’n v. King, 678 F.3d 898, 901 
(10th Cir. 2012) (“The FCRA leaves no room for overlapping state regulations. Congress set 
out to create uniform, national standards in the area of credit reporting . . . .”) (dicta). 
 163.  See supra text accompanying note 75. 
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the remainder of this Article will focus on express and 
implied preemption. 
The FCRA’s non-preemption language shows that Congress 
presumed that the federal statute could coexist peacefully with a state 
statute, even one that overlies the same territory, so long as the two 
are not inconsistent. In this way the FCRA expressly incorporates a 
version of the implied preemption doctrine to supplement the Act’s 
express preemption provisions, discussed infra. A state law is 
inconsistent with a federal law only if complying with one would put 
the actor in violation of the other,164 or if it would frustrate a 
particular purpose of the federal act.165 
3. Specific express preemption provisions 
The FCRA somewhat undercuts its general rule of non-
preemption by listing five sets of FCRA provisions that it protects 
against any “requirement or prohibition [that] may be imposed 
under the laws of any State.”166 Three of these sets target fairly 
narrow practices of the FCRA: (1) The exchange of information 
among business affiliates;167 (2) designated disclosures required by 
the FCRA;168 and (3) the frequency with which consumers can 
obtain free consumer reports.169 
Along with those three narrow sets, however, the remaining two 
sets cover a broad array of FCRA provisions. The two differ in the 
 
 164.  See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143 (1963). 
 165.  See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); Equifax Servs., Inc. v. Cohen, 
420 A.2d 189, 211 (Me. 1980) (testing the state provision against the “‘full purposes and 
objectives’” of Congress). 
 166.  15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b). 
 167.  § 1681t(b)(2); see also Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Gould, 412 F.3d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 
2005) (holding that this provision preempted that part of the California Financial Information 
Privacy Act to the extent that it attempted to regulate the communication of information 
among affiliates), appealed after remand, sub nom. Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Lockyer, 541 F.3d 
1214 (9th Cir. 2008) cert. denied, 557 U.S. 935 (2009) (narrowing the state statute to sever 
the preempted portion). 
 168.  15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(3). The FCRA specifically exempts from this prohibition 
specified laws of the States of California, § 1681t(b)(3)(A), and Colorado. § 1681t(b)(3)(B). 
In addition, the Act limits the effect of this prohibition on state laws regulating insurance 
activity. § 1681t(b)(3)(C). 
 169.  § 1681t(b)(4). The FCRA specifically exempts from this prohibition specified laws 
of the States of Colorado, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Vermont 
in effect on December 4, 2003. § 1681t(b)(4)(A)-(G). 
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reach of the area around which the identified provisions remain 
reserved for the federal monopoly. The first of these sets, which we 
will call “subject matter preempters,” preempts state requirements or 
prohibitions imposed as to the “subject matter regulated under” 
eleven specific FCRA provisions.170 The other group, which we will 
 
 170.  § 1681t(b)(1)(A)–(I). These eleven provisions are as follows: 
(A) subsection (c) or (e) of section 1681b of this title, relating to the prescreening 
of consumer reports; 
(B) section 1681i of this title, relating to the time by which a consumer reporting 
agency must take any action, including the provision of notification to a consumer 
or other person, in any procedure related to the disputed accuracy of information in 
a consumer’s file, except that this subparagraph shall not apply to any State law in 
effect on September 30, 1996; 
(C) subsections (a) and (b) of section 1681m of this title, relating to the duties of a 
person who takes any adverse action with respect to a consumer; 
(D) section 1681m(d) of this title, relating to the duties of persons who use a 
consumer report of a consumer in connection with any credit or insurance 
transaction that is not initiated by the consumer and that consists of a firm offer of 
credit or insurance; 
(E) section 1681c of this title, relating to information contained in consumer 
reports, except that this subparagraph shall not apply to any State law in effect on 
September 30, 1996; 
(F) section 1681s-2 of this title, relating to the responsibilities of persons who 
furnish information to consumer reporting agencies, except that this paragraph shall 
not apply— 
(i) with respect to section 54A(a) of chapter 93 of the Massachusetts Annotated 
Laws (as in effect on September 30, 1996); or 
(ii) with respect to section 1785.25(a) of the California Civil Code (as in effect on 
September 30, 1996); 
(G) section 1681g(e) of this title, relating to information available to victims under 
section 1681g(e) of this title; 
(H) section 1681s-3 of this title, relating to the exchange and use of information to 
make a solicitation for marketing purposes; or 
(I) section 1681m(h) of this title, relating to the duties of users of consumer reports 
to provide notice with respect to terms in certain credit transactions. 
§ 1681t(b)(1); see Banga v. Equifax Info. Servs. LLC, No. 14-CV-03038-WHO, 2015 WL 
3799546, at *8 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 2014) (holding that a state credit reporting act’s 
prescreening provision was preempted by section 1681t(b)(1)(A)); Bauer v. Target Corp., 
2012 WL 4054296, 8:12-CV-978-T-AEP, 2012 WL 4054296, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 14, 
2012) (holding that § 1681t(b)(1)(F) preempted a claim under a Florida state debt collection 
statute’s provision that regulated furnishers’ disclosure of information about a debt); Galper v. 
JPMorgan Chase, N.A., No. 13 CIV. 3449, 2014 WL 1089061, at *3–5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 
2014) (holding that both a conversion claim and a claim brought under a state statute that 
restricted the transmission of information resulting from identity theft against a bank that had 
allegedly made false reports to credit reporting agencies was preempted by section 
1681t(b)(1)(F)); Dickman v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 876 F. Supp. 2d 166, 175 (E.D.N.Y. 
2012) (concluding that claims for breach of contract and for violation of a state deceptive 
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call “conduct preempters,” has a narrower scope, eliminating only 
those state requirements or prohibitions that pertain to the “conduct 
required by” eleven additional FCRA provisions.171 If we think of the 
 
practices act based on a furnisher’s furnishing of false information to a credit reporting agency 
was preempted by section 1681t(b)(1)(F)); Okocha v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 700 F. Supp. 
2d 369, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that a claim for violation of a state deceptive practices 
act against an information furnisher for furnishing false information to a credit reporting 
agency was preempted by section 1681t(b)(1)(F)); Consumer Data Indus. Ass’n v. Swanson, 
No. 07-CV-3376 PJSJJG, 2007 WL 2219389, at *4 (D. Minn. July 30, 2007) (holding that a 
state statute prohibiting “mortgage trigger” lists was preempted by section 1681t(b)(1)(A)); 
see also Premium Mortg. Corp. v. Equifax, Inc., 583 F.3d 103, 106–07 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(holding that mortgage lenders’ claims for misappropriation of trade secrets, unfair 
competition, and unjust enrichment brought against credit reporting agencies for their use of 
mortgage “trigger leads” were preempted by section 1681t(b)(1)(A)). 
A recent Second Circuit opinion rejected a broad reading of these “subject matter” 
preemption provisions. In Galper v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., the plaintiff, an identity theft 
victim, sued the defendant, a bank whose employees had allegedly facilitated the identity theft. 
802 F.3d at 442. The plaintiff brought a claim under a state identity theft statute, asserting a 
theory of vicarious liability pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior. Id. at 446. The 
Second Circuit vacated the trial court’s dismissal of her claim, reasoning that section 
1681t(b)(1)(F) preempts only those claims that concern a furnisher’s responsibilities, and not 
all claims brought against an entity that also happens to be a furnisher. Id. The court rejected 
the defendant’s argument that the preemption provision “preempts all claims ‘relating to the 
responsibilities’ of furnishers in any way . . . regardless of the capacity in which the furnisher is 
acting.” Id. at 447. Rather, the court reasoned that “Congress opted . . . to use language that 
focuses more narrowly on the preemption of laws that regulate the responsibilities of persons 
who furnish information to consumer reporting agencies.” Id. (emphasis in original). 
 171.  § 1681t(b)(5)(A)–(I). This provision states as follows: 
(b) General exceptions 
No requirement or prohibition may be imposed under the laws of any State— 
* * * 
(5) with respect to the conduct required by the specific provisions of— 
(A) section 1681c(g) of this title [pertains to truncation of credit card and debit 
card numbers]; 
(B) section 1681c-1 of this title [pertains to identity theft prevention, fraud alerts, 
and active duty alerts]; 
(C) section 1681c-2 of this title [pertains to the blocking of information resulting 
from identity theft]; 
(D) section 1681g(a)(1)(A) of this title [pertains to the truncation of consumers’ 
social security numbers on their reports at their request]; 
(E) section 1681j(a) of this title [pertains to charges for reports made to consumers, 
including the annual free report, and the time for reinvestigations of information on 
such reports]; 
(F) subsections (e), (f), and (g) of section 1681m of this title [pertain, respectively, 
to the requirement that agencies issue “red flag” guidelines and regulations; the 
prohibition on the sale or transfer of debt caused by identity theft; and 
communications required of debt collectors concerning identity theft]; 
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provisions given preemptive power as poles planted in the ground of 
potential state regulation, those of the subject matter preempters will 
cast a state-law-free shadow around them equivalent in scope to the 
subject matter of that provision. In general, the conduct preempters 
will cast almost no shadow at all—just wide enough to cover nearly 
identical state provisions, or those that require identical conduct. 
Finally, the FCRA blocks state law in one other instance—not by 
preempting it, but by providing qualified immunity from certain 
state torts to designated actors.172 The immunity is not absolute; a 
consumer can overcome it by showing that the defendant provided 
false information with malice or with willful intent to injure the 
consumer.173 The provision plays a robust part in the analysis of 
preemption of the common law claims it identifies, because its gears 
must mesh with those of the preemption provisions in order to allow 
all of the provisions to be effective. The rule against surplusage 
encourages giving full meaning to every provision in an act, and 
discourages interpretations that render a provision superfluous.174 
Accordingly, courts have had to struggle to harmonize the 
preemption provisions with the qualified immunity provision in 
order to ensure that they do not obviate the immunity—after all, no 
one needs to be immunized from a preempted state law. 
 
(G) section 1681s(f) of this title [pertains to required coordination among 
consumer reporting agencies with respect to consumer complaint investigations]; 
(H) section 1681s-2(a)(6) of this title [pertains to the duties of furnishers upon 
notice of identity theft-related information]; or 
(I) section 1681w of this title [pertains to the required disposal of records]. 
 172.  This provision states as follows: 
Except as provided in sections 1681n and 1681o of this title, no consumer may 
bring any action or proceeding in the nature of defamation, invasion of privacy, or 
negligence with respect to the reporting of information against any consumer 
reporting agency, any user of information, or any person who furnishes information 
to a consumer reporting agency, based on information disclosed pursuant to section 
1681g, 1681h, or 1681m of this title, or based on information disclosed by a user 
of a consumer report to or for a consumer against whom the user has taken adverse 
action, based in whole or in part on the report except as to false information 
furnished with malice or willful intent to injure such consumer. 
§ 1681h(e). 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  This is known as the rule against surplusage. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 
(2001) (it is a “cardinal rule of statutory construction” that “a statute ought, upon the whole, 
to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be 
superfluous, void, or insignificant”) (internal citations omitted). 
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However, the impact of the qualified immunity provision is 
relatively irrelevant for the purpose of enacting reputation-protecting 
state statutes. The question of the pool of laws subject to qualified 
immunity has import for only those state causes of action that are “in 
the nature of defamation, invasion of privacy, or negligence.”175 So 
long as a state statute avoids presenting itself as a law of one of these 
flavors, it will not be subject to qualified immunity. Therefore, no 
further discussion of the qualified immunity provision of the FCRA 
is necessary here. 
In its preemption provisions, the FCRA focuses on state 
“requirement[s] or prohibition[s]” that have a particular relationship 
with a specified FCRA provision.176 So, the question arises: How 
would the Supreme Court define the breadth of such a relationship? 
4. Significant areas clearly free from FCRA preemption 
The FCRA identifies a slew of express preemption provisions that 
require close analysis to determine the extent of areas of regulation 
fenced off from the states.177 Nonetheless, large patches of the Act’s 
coverage are left bare for state intervention. The specific rules 
regarding medical information, for instance, include restrictions on 
identifying information reported by medical information furnishers178 
and on creditor use of medical information.179 In addition, most of 
the Act’s provisions requiring consumer reporting agencies to put 
accurate information in agency-issued consumer reports are free 
from preemption language. This means that states themselves can 
tighten accuracy standards, improving the protection of their 
consumers’ reputations.180 Similarly, states may enact requirements to 
 
 175.  § 1681h(e). 
 176.  § 1681t(b)(1)–(5). While the FCRA uses “relating to” in its preemption section, it 
does so only to describe the content of the specific preempting provisions. It uses “with respect 
to” to describe the relationship between the state law and the preempting subject matter. 
§ 1681t(b)(5). 
 177.  See supra text accompanying notes 166 to 171. 
 178.  § 1681c(a)(6)(A); see § 1681a(i) (defining medical information). 
 179.  § 1681b(g)(2); see also § 1681b(g)(1)(C) (requiring agencies to code medical 
information so that the substance of the medical portion is hidden). 
 180.  § 1681e(b) (requiring that “[w]henever a consumer reporting agency prepares a 
consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of 
the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates”). 
01.DEARMOND.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/11/2016  3:15 PM 
365 Preventing Preemption 
 403 
reinvestigate challenged data that would be more stringent than 
those in the FCRA.181 The FCRA also left its requirements for 
obtaining a report for employment purposes free from preemptive 
effect, leaving that area open to the states.182 
In addition, the FCRA has special requirements for reports that 
contain detrimental public record information—information that 
would include bankruptcy and criminal record information.183 This 
provision falls outside of FCRA preemption provisions, permitting 
states to impose additional requirements for public record 
information that agencies place in reports. 
Finally, the FCRA’s remedies provisions are largely unaffected by 
the FCRA’s preemption provisions.184 States can therefore provide 
additional protection to consumers by enhancing the remedies 
available to those injured by the violation of a state provision, for 
instance, by offering treble damages. Although a pair of Colorado 
district courts have concluded that the FCRA’s willfulness damages 
provision did preempt a Colorado statute’s treble damages 
provision,185 one court seemed to misunderstand both the FCRA’s 
punitive damages provision and the presumption 
against preemption.186 
 
 181.  § 1681i.  
 182.  § 1681b; 1681b(b). 
 183.  § 1681k. 
 184.  § 1681n (civil liability for willful non-compliance); 1681o (civil liability for 
negligent non-compliance). A few FCRA provisions are expressly free from the act’s private 
remedies provisions. See, e.g., § 1681s-s(a), (c)(1), g(e)(6). 
 185.  Maiteki v. Knight Transp. Inc., 12-CV-2021-WJM-CBS, 2015 WL 328250, at *5 
(D. Colo. Jan. 23, 2015); Eller v. Trans Union LLC, No. 09-CV-0040-WJM-KMT, 2012 WL 
786283, at *3–4 (D. Colo. Mar. 9, 2012). 
 186.  Eller, 2012 WL 786283 at *3. In assessing the FCRA’s provision for damages for 
willfulness, the court noted only that the FCRA allows statutory damages, and failed to note 
that the act also provides for punitive damages. See § 1681n(a)(1)(B)(2). Not only did the 
court fail to note the general rule of non-preemption in section 1681t(a), it misread the 
subsequent subsection as providing a list of FCRA provisions that were exempt from 
preemption, when in fact it provides a list of subsections that are expressly given preemptive 
effect. § 1681t(b); see supra text accompanying notes 166 to 171. Another Colorado district 
court has permitted claims for punitive damages under both the FCRA and the Colorado 
Consumer Credit Reporting Act, though without analyzing preemption. Eller v. Experian 
Info. Solutions, Inc., No. 09–cv–00040–WJM–KMT, 2011 WL 3365955, at *18–19 (D. 
Colo. May 17, 2011), magistrate’s report and recommendation adopted No. 09–cv–00040–
WJM–KMT, 2011 WL 3365513 (Aug. 4, 2011). 
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Infra, the FCRA’s preemption provisions, viewed through the 
prism of the Supreme Court’s recent express and implied preemption 
decisions, are applied to four areas that are attractive candidates for 
state regulation: employers’ use of credit reports and other kinds of 
background checks, the inclusion of criminal record information, the 
inclusion of medical debt information, and identity theft protections. 
B. Strategies for States 
The FCRA’s relationship to state law, along with its express 
preemption provisions, allow a fair amount of room in which states 
could operate to protect the reputations of their citizens, so long as 
states craft those provisions carefully.  
With respect to the regulation of consumer reports, no one 
could credibly argue that consumer credit reporting is subject to 
field preemption given the Act’s express statement that except as 
otherwise provided, the Act does not “annul, affect, or exempt any 
person subject to the [FCRA’s] provisions . . . .”187 The preemption 
analysis benefits from the purpose presumption, a precept the Court 
has often stressed, in “that ‘the historic police powers of the States’ 
are not superseded ‘unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress.’”188 The Court has repeatedly emphasized this point.189 By 
expressly stating a general rule that the FCRA does not preempt state 
law, Congress effectively nullified field preemption. Under the 
remaining two preemption theories, a state statute that may tread on 
an area in which Congress has toiled has to clear three analytical 
hurdles: express preemption, and the two types of implied 
preemption—implied impossibility preemption, and implied 
obstacle preemption.190 
Taken together, the FCRA’s express preemption provisions 
evince that Congress sought near exclusive control over the 
 
 187.  § 1681t(a); see also supra text accompanying notes 159 to 165. 
 188.  Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe 
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
 189.  See, e.g., Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 
2256 (2013); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009); Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 
70, 77 (2008); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator 
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
 190.  See supra text accompanying notes 78 to 153. 
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regulation of information furnishers first,191 followed by a somewhat 
less vigorous interest in controlling consumer reporting agencies, 
and even less interest in controlling users of consumer credit reports. 
This indicates that the kind of state legislation most likely to survive 
the preemption provision gauntlet is legislation targeted at the users 
of specific information. Further, while some regulation of credit 
agencies might be permitted, very little regulation of furnishers will 
be tolerated. Infra, each area of recent concern is evaluated in light 
of potential express and implied preemption challenges. 
1. Employers’ use of credit reports 
The FCRA contemplates that employers will use credit reports in 
selecting and placing employees. It specifically designates 
employment purposes as a permissible reason for looking at a 
person’s credit history.192 While the Act imposes slightly more 
onerous terms on employers than those that apply to, for example, 
run-of-the-mill creditors that use credit reports,193 by and large it 
permits employers as much access to an individual’s credit history as 
any other entity that can claim a permissible purpose. 
However, the express preemption doctrine would not block a 
state law that prohibited employers from obtaining reports for 
employment purposes. None of the FCRA’s express preemption 
provisions cover the Act’s permissible purposes provision, which 
permits an employer to acquire a credit report for employment 
purposes.194 Absolutely nothing in the FCRA itself requires an 
 
 191.  A number of decisions have concluded that the preemption provision of § 
1681t(b)(1)(F), which preempts a state “requirement or prohibition . . . with respect to any 
subject matter regulated under— . . . section 1681s-2 of this title, relating to the 
responsibilities of persons who furnish information to consumer reporting agencies” preempts 
a state law claim arising from a furnisher’s furnishing of such information. See, e.g., Premium 
Mortg. Corp. v. Equifax, Inc., 583 F.3d 103, 106 (2d Cir. 2009); Barberan v. Nationpoint, 
706 F. Supp. 2d 408, 426–29 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); see also Aleshire v. Harris, 586 Fed. App’x 
668, 671 (7th Cir. 2013) (concluding that the plaintiff had forfeited her argument, but 
reasoning that nonetheless the “argument is without merit because state law tort claims are 
‘requirement[s]’ for preemption purposes”) (emphasis and citation omitted). 
 192.  § 1681b(a)(3)(B). 
 193.  The employer must notify the consumer that a consumer report may be obtained 
for employment purposes and the consumer must authorize the employer’s procurement of a 
consumer report. § 1681b(2)(A)(ii). 
 194.  § 1681b. 
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employer to obtain a credit report; accordingly an employer could 
meet the demands of both the FCRA and a state law prohibiting 
employers from accessing credit reports simply by abiding by the 
state law. Thus, implied impossibility preemption would not arise. 
As for implied obstacle preemption, recent Supreme Court 
decisions indicate deference to state schemes, so long as the area is 
not one in which Congress has pervasively regulated.195 Given Wyeth 
v. Levine’s heavy reliance on the purpose presumption, and the 
FCRA’s own express reservation of power to states, any state law 
limiting employers (or other users) from acquiring credit reports 
would very likely clear implied obstacle analysis. 
2. Criminal record information 
State statutes that prohibit consumer reporting agencies from 
including certain types of state record information on credit reports 
are more vulnerable to express preemption. The state restrictions 
described in Section II.A supra restrict specific users from asking for, 
acquiring, or using credit information. An alternate method to 
regulate the trafficking of personal information is to regulate the 
content of a consumer report rather than its acquisition. In short, 
not “user, you cannot buy this,” but “agency, you cannot sell this.” 
This may appear to be an unnecessarily fine distinction, but the 
FCRA’s express preemption provisions render this distinction 
highly meaningful. 
The FCRA has a content preemption provision that prevents 
states from regulating the “subject matter . . . [of] section 1681c,”196 
identified as “relating to information contained in consumer 
reports.”197 Criminal background information is content 
information; furthermore it is content information that section 
1681c specifically accounts for in part by effectively rendering arrest 
records as obsolete, and thus ineligible for inclusion in a consumer 
report, after seven years.198 The question is whether a state law more 
protective of such information than section 1681c—one that 
prohibits consumer reporting agencies outright from placing 
 
 195.  See supra text accompanying notes 146 to 153. 
 196.  § 1681t(b)(1)(E). 
 197.  § 1681c. 
 198.  § 1681c(a)(2). 
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criminal background information in consumer reports—would be 
seen as relating to the subject matter of this section in light of the 
Supreme Court decisions construing the effects of express 
preemption provisions. 
While the title of the section identified as preempted is broad—
“[r]equirements relating to information contained in consumer 
reports”199—the actual scope of the section is much narrower. It does 
not purport to regulate content as a whole, but rather focuses on 
specific items of information that should be excluded because the 
information is old. This section addresses criminal record 
information in three ways. First, it provides that consumer reporting 
agencies may not, in general, report arrest records (or other adverse 
criminal record information,200 aside from convictions) that are more 
than seven years old.201 Second, agencies may nonetheless report 
those records where a credit transaction or life insurance 
underwriting is for $150,000 or more, or where the report is “to be 
used in connection with . . . the employment of [someone who will 
receive a salary] of $75,000 or more.”202 Finally, agencies may report 
all criminal convictions in perpetuity.203 In analyzing the power of the 
obsolescence provisions to preempt, one court concluded that the 
FCRA’s obsolescence provision preempted a parallel Colorado 
provision that prohibited criminal convictions that were more than 
seven years old, reasoning that the state provision was clearly of the 
same subject matter—the length of time an agency can report a 
criminal conviction.204 This analysis evinces a broad reading of the 
section, one not necessarily justified by its content, as discussed next. 
 
 199.  § 1681c. 
 200.  § 1681(a)(5) prohibits the reporting of “[a]ny other adverse item of information, 
other than records of convictions of crimes which antedates the report by more than seven 
years.” Criminal record information qualifies as an “adverse item of information.” See, e.g., 
Haley v. TalentWise, Inc., 9 F. Supp. 3d 1188, 1192 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (information 
regarding dismissed criminal charges qualified as “adverse” information). 
 201.  § 1681c(a)(2), (5) (prohibiting agencies from reporting arrest records “more than 
seven years” old or after “the governing statute of limitations has expired, whichever 
is . . . longer”). 
 202.  § 1681c(b)(1)–(3). 
 203.  § 1681c(a)(5) (exempting criminal conviction records from the general rule that 
agencies may not report “any . . . adverse item of information” “more than seven years” old). 
 204. See Simon v. DirecTV, Inc., 09–cv–00852–PAB–KLM, 2010 WL 1452853, at *4 
(D. Colo. Mar. 19, 2010) (report and recommendation of magistrate judge), adopted by 09–
cv–00852–PAB–KLM, 2010 WL 1452854 (D. Colo. Apr. 12, 2010). 
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However, the FCRA provision is less about the substantive 
character of the information and much more about its age. The 
provision establishes that information is sufficiently “fresh” only for 
the designated period of time, without governing the content itself. 
This construction casts the provision as closely resembling the 
express preemption provision analyzed in Altria, where the Supreme 
Court interpreted the preemption provision—“[n]o requirement or 
prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under 
State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any 
cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the 
provisions of this chapter”205—as applying only to state laws based on 
smoking and health. Reading the span of section 1681t(b)(1)(E) as 
reaching only the subject matter of state laws that address the 
obsolescence of criminal record information would mean that under 
the reasoning of Altria, a broader statute, like the Maine deceptive 
practices act involved in that case, would not be construed as 
addressing the specific material that the preemption provision refers 
to. The Court construed the state statute in Altria as imposing a 
general duty not to deceive, rather than one that was more narrowly 
based on “smoking and health.” Here, the FCRA’s content 
preemption provision could apply only to state laws regulating the 
time for which an item with specified content could remain on a 
report, not the initial eligibility of the information to ever be 
included in a report. Nonetheless, such an analysis would arguably 
be an inapt adaptation of Altria, given that the state statute in that 
case was a broadly applicable anti-fraud statute, in contrast to the 
sort of content-specific state credit report statute that states might 
consider limiting information placed in credit reports. Proponents of 
a state ban on criminal record content might have to argue that 
Altria should permit narrow state statutes where the coverage of the 
federal statute’s express preemption provision was also 
commensurately narrower. 
What’s more, section 1681c relates specifically to what consumer 
reporting agencies can put into a consumer report; every subsection 
pertains to what an agency can and cannot do.206 Nothing in the 
section pertains to what an employer can or cannot do. Hence, one 
 
 205.  15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2012). 
 206.  15 U.S.C. § 1681c. 
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fair alternative to regulating the criminal record content of a 
consumer report issued for employment purposes would be to tell 
employers that they may not request a consumer report that includes 
such criminal record information, or that if an employer receives a 
report containing such information, the employer may not use it. 
This approach regulates users, rather than furnishers or agencies, and 
would create, in essence, an anti-discrimination law. This is the 
approach taken by some states, including California and Illinois, in 
recently enacted consumer report cloaking provisions that appear to 
include reports of criminal history.207 In this way the restriction 
becomes a restriction on users of consumer reports, not creators of 
consumer reports, and likely should fall outside the preemptive 
effects of 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(E). 
Under this—a constrained reading of the preemption provision 
that would comport with the general rule that federal courts should 
so read such provisions—a state would be permitted to prohibit 
criminal records on credit reports, so long as it did not address the 
length of time that other categories of information could be 
reported by a consumer reporting agency. In contrast, a state statute 
that sought to limit the window of time that a criminal record 
(whether arrest, conviction, or other) could be reported would likely 
be construed as intruding on the subject matter of the FCRA’s 
obsolescence provision and thereby would be preempted. 
3. Medical debt restrictions 
Using similar reasoning, states should be able to pass 
preemption-proof restrictions on the placement of medical debt 
information in consumer reports. While states have not yet acted in 
 
 207.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5(a) (2011 & Supp. 2016); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
70/10(a). California’s provision broadly defines “consumer credit report” to include “any 
written, oral, or other communication of any information by a consumer credit reporting 
agency bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, or credit capacity, which is 
used or is expected to be used, or collected in whole or in part for [designated permissible 
purposes, including employment purposes.” CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5(a) (2011 & Supp. 
2016) (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.3(c) (2012)). Similarly, Illinois’s provision defines a 
credit report to mean “any written or other communication of any information by a consumer 
reporting agency that bears on a consumer’s creditworthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, 
or credit history.” 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/5(a) (2008 & Supp. 2016). These two provisions 
capture criminal record information to the extent it’s considered to impact creditworthiness. 
See also supra text accompanying notes 41 to 52. 
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this area, the fact that the 113th Congress considered a bill that 
would have prohibited consumer reporting agencies from putting 
designated medical debt in a credit report could inspire states to 
do so.208 
Concerns over the privacy of medical information motivated 
Congress to add protections to the FCRA when it revised the act in 
1996. Congress limited the use of medical information by creditors, 
insurers, and employers.209 It defined medical information broadly, 
encompassing “information or data . . . that relates to—(A) the past, 
present, or future physical, mental, or behavioral health or condition 
of an individual . . . .”210 The FCRA’s restrictions on the use of such 
information are more protective in the case of employment use than 
in the case of an insurance transaction—for an insurance transaction, 
the consumer need only consent to the furnishing of the medical 
information.211 However, for reports issued for employment or credit 
transaction purposes, the agency may include the consumer’s medical 
information in the report only if the information is relevant to the 
transaction and the consumer has given “specific written consent 
for . . . the report[.]” This consent must “describe[] in clear and 
conspicuous language the use for which the information will 
be furnished.”212 
Two of the FCRA’s express preemption provisions may impact 
state regulation of medical debt information in consumer reports, 
one relating to the content of reports and one relating to the 
regulation of information furnishers. First, as discussed supra, the 
FCRA has an express preemption provision that prevents states from 
regulating the subject matter of section 1681c, relating to the 
 
 208.  S. 160, The Medical Debt Responsibility Act of 2013 § 3, 113th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(2013) (proposing an amendment to 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a), the obsolescence provision 
described supra, that would delete from credit reports “[a]ny information related to a fully 
paid or settled medical debt that had been characterized as delinquent, charged off, or in 
collection which, from the date of payment or settlement, antedates the report by more than 
45 days”). 
 209.  15 U.S.C. § 1681b(g). 
 210.  § 1681a(i). 
 211.  § 1681b(g)(1)(A). 
 212.  § 1681b(g)(1)(B). The act does permit agencies to include medical information 
that “pertains solely to transactions, accounts, or balances relating to debts arising from the 
receipt of medical services, products, or devises [sic]” where the information is coded to avoid 
identifying the “nature of [the] services, products, or devices.” § 1681b(g)(1)(C). 
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content of information contained in consumer reports.213 However, 
in contrast to its treatment of criminal record content information, 
discussed supra, section 1681c says very little about medical 
information content. The only reference to the medical industry 
pertains to a report’s inclusion of the identifying information of any 
medical information furnisher; the FCRA requires agencies to 
withhold such information unless it is coded to avoid disclosing the 
nature of the provider and what it has provided.214 
Accordingly, under the relatively state-friendly ruling of Altria, if 
the preemption provision’s reference to the content of section 1681c 
were read to size itself down to the very specific and limited content 
restriction contained within section 1681c, then a broader state law 
banning the inclusion of medical debt would appear to address 
subject matter that differed from that in section 1681c, allowing a 
state law ban to survive express preemption under this theory. The 
main restrictions on the inclusion of medical information in 
consumer reports are located not in section 1681c, which is the 
target of an express preemption provision, but in section 1681b(g), 
which is not such a target.215 Accordingly, states should remain free 
to decide what medical information content agencies may and may 
not put in reports, so long as they do not put agencies in the 
position of being unable to comply with both the state provision and 
 
 213.  § 1681t(b)(1)(E); see supra text accompanying note 170. 
 214.  § 1681c(a)(6). Specifically, the name, address, and telephone number of the 
medical information furnisher are withheld. Id. This restriction does not apply if the agency is 
providing the report to an insurance company for something “other than property [or] 
casualty insurance”—meaning the agency can provided non-coded identifying information to 
an insurance company that wants the report for medical, life, or other sorts of insurance. The 
FCRA references medical information in a number of other ways. First, in general, information 
that would otherwise be a consumer report is not such if it meets the terms of the Act’s 
affiliate sharing exemption. § 1681a(d)(2)(A). However, that exception does not apply when 
affiliates share medical information. § 1681a(d)(3). In addition, the FCRA imposes somewhat 
stricter requirements on reports furnished for employment or credit purposes that contain 
medical information, requiring that the information be relevant to the transaction and that the 
consumer provide specific consent for the furnishing of the report. § 1681b(g)(B). 
Nonetheless, information about medical debts may be included without those restrictions so 
long as the information is coded to obscure the “specific provider . . .  [and] the nature of . . . 
[the medical] services, products, or devices” giving rise to the debt. § 1681b(g)(1)(C). So, as 
long as the agency codes the information, it may place it in the report, including the amount 
of the debt—that amount, of course, being precisely what will harm the consumer’s 
credit rating. 
 215.  Specifically, section 1681b(g)(1). 
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the FCRA (which would lead to obstacle-impossibility 
preemption)216 or act so broadly as to disrupt the purpose of the 
FCRA (which would lead to obstacle-purpose preemption).217 
Once such a state law has cleared preemption of the subject 
matter of the FCRA’s content restriction provision, a state law 
limiting medical debt information in consumer reports would then 
have to hurdle section 1681t(b)(1)(F), an express preemption 
provision prohibiting states from regulating the subject matter of the 
FCRA’s main furnisher-responsibilities provision. However, even this 
more specific subject matter preemption provision in the FCRA 
should not impede states much. As discussed supra, this preemption 
provision provides merely that states may not regulate the subject 
matter of, among other provisions, a provision that requires 
furnishers “whose primary business is providing medical services, 
products, or devices” to notify the agency of their status as medical 
information furnishers, a rather small, perfunctory provision.218 Thus, 
given a narrow construction, this preempting provision forbids states 
from regulating the subject matter of notifications by medical 
information furnishers to consumer reporting agencies. This 
preempting provision is far narrower than that of the Medical Device 
Amendment Act in Riegel, which preempted any state law beyond 
one that was an identical twin to the federal law, leading the Court 
to conclude that it barred state products liability claims.219 
California’s Supreme Court has in fact construed this preemption 
provision narrowly, extending “only to state laws relating to 
furnisher accuracy or dispute resolution.”220 Accordingly, the 
provision did not preempt a claim under a state medical privacy 
statute.221 Thus, a state provision barring medical debts from credit 
reports that did not relate to furnisher accuracy or dispute resolution 
should clear express preemption. 
 
 216.  See supra text accompanying notes 134 to 145. 
 217.  See supra text accompanying notes 147 to 153. 
 218.  § 1681t(b)(1)(F) (incorporating § 1681s-2(a)(9)). 
 219.  See supra text accompanying notes 105 to 111. 
 220.  Brown v. Mortensen, 51 Cal. 4th 1052, 1064–65 (Cal. 2011) (rejecting argument 
that the FCRA barred a claim under California’s Confidentiality of Medical Information Act 
that arose from a dentist’s sharing of the medical records of a client and his sons, concluding 
that the state act targeted different subject matter from that of section 1681s-2). 
 221.  Id. at 1065. 
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As for implied impossibility preemption, nothing would force an 
agency to violate a state law forbidding the inclusion of medical debt 
in credit reports in order to comply with the FCRA, because nothing 
in the FCRA requires an agency to include medical debt in a 
consumer report. Accordingly, that doctrine would not nullify a state 
effort to keep medical debt out of consumers’ credit reports. 
As for implied obstacle preemption, a medical debt restriction 
would not be at direct odds with the FCRA’s purposes, one of which 
is, ultimately, to protect consumers.222 Thus a state provision limiting 
the corrosive effects of involuntary expenditures for medical services 
would be entirely consistent with that purpose. The FCRA’s pro-
consumer purpose contrasts distinctly with that of the federal motor 
carrier services law construed in Rowe and its purpose to have market 
forces, rather than state legislatures, impose limits. That purpose 
conflicted with the youth-protecting purpose of the state anti-
tobacco law, and thus the state law fell.223 Therefore, a restriction on 
medical debt would not become null under a theory of implied 
obstacle preemption. 
In short, states likely have a fair amount of room to exclude 
medical debt from consumer credit reports, and could use that room 
to help their citizens maintain the confidentiality of their 
unanticipated or unaffordable medical expenses. Thus, states that are 
concerned about the effects of medical debt on their citizens’ credit 
reports could prohibit agencies from putting such debts into 
credit reports. 
4. Identity theft protections 
States may be a good deal more hampered when it comes to 
protecting their consumers from the crushing damage that can arise 
when an identity thief has poisoned a consumer’s credit report with 
the thief ’s own transactions. As described supra, New Mexico took 
the step of enacting a provision making it reasonably easy for a 
consumer to block information arising from an identity thief’s 
 
 222.  See § 1681(a)(4) (stating that “[t]here is a need to insure [sic] that consumer 
reporting agencies exercise their grave responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and a respect 
for the consumer’s right to privacy”). 
 223.  See supra text accompanying notes 112 to 120. 
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debts.224 However, when Congress added identity theft–protections 
to the FCRA,225 it also boosted the preemption subsection to 
specifically address those protections, staking out some exclusive 
federal territory. The identity theft–related protections sheltered by 
an express preemption provision include some duties imposed on 
furnishers,226 consumer reporting agencies,227 the FTC and other 
 
 224.  See supra text accompanying notes 65 to 68. 
 225.  Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, Pub. L. 108-159, 117 Stat. 
1952 (2003). 
 226.  The following duties of furnishers relate to identity theft and are subject to a 
preemption provision: Furnishers’ duties to “have in place reasonable procedures to respond to 
any notification that it receives from a consumer reporting agency . . . relating to information 
resulting from identity theft, to prevent that person from refurnishing such blocked 
information.” § 1681s-2(a)(6)(A), subject to § 1681t(b)(1)(F) (subject matter). 
Furnishers’ duties to refrain from furnishing information resulting from identity theft, where 
the consumer has submitted an identity theft report to the furnisher. § 1681s-2(a)(6)(B), 
subject to § 1681t(b)(1)(F) (subject matter). To trigger the furnisher’s duty, the consumer 
must have submitted the report “at the address specified by [the furnisher] for receiving such 
reports.” § 1681s-2(a)(6)(B). The furnisher may resume reporting the information if it 
“subsequently knows or is informed by the consumer that the information is correct.” Id. 
One court, however, has upheld a state identity theft provision against a preemption challenge 
that asserted that the provision was within the “subject matter” regulated by section 1681s-
2(a)(6), concluding that the “state [action] . . . concern[ed] the direct relationship between 
the credit provider and the consumer,” rather than one that fell within the “subject matter” of 
a furnisher’s “reporting of credit information” to a consumer reporting agency. Pasternak v. 
Trans Union, C07-04980MJJ, 2008 WL 928840, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2008). 
 227.  The following duties of consumer reporting agencies are subject to a preemption 
provision: Consumer reporting agencies’ duty to notify one who has requested a consumer 
report that the address in the request “substantially differs from the addresses in the file of the 
consumer.” § 1681c(h)(1). In theory the subject matter of this provision is subject to 
preemption pursuant to § 1681t(b)(1)(E). 
Agencies’ duties to provide fraud alerts, extended fraud alerts, and active duty alerts, and to 
refer alerts to other nationwide consumer reporting agencies, and for resellers to reconvey 
alerts, and to provide consumers with information on how to contact the Bureau of Consumer 
Financial Protection. § 1681c-1. The conduct required by this provision is subject to 
preemption pursuant to § 1681t(b)(5)(B). 
Agencies’ duties to block the reporting of identified theft-related information from a 
consumer’s report, and to notify the information’s furnisher of the block. § 1681c-2. This 
provision is subject to the conduct-required-by preemption provision of § 1681t(b)(5)(B). 
This provision allows consumer reporting agencies to rescind or decline the block under the 
following circumstances: 
[T]he consumer reporting agency reasonably determines that— 
(A) the information was blocked in error or a block was requested by the 
consumer in error; 
(B) the information was blocked, or a block was requested by the 
consumer, on the basis of a material misrepresentation of fact by the 
consumer relevant to the request to block; or 
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federal agencies,228 businesses that transact with identity thieves,229 
owners of debts resulting from identity thieves,230 and 
debt collectors.231 
The relevant FCRA provisions generally regulate furnishers and 
agencies.232 Furnishers must refrain from furnishing to consumer 
reporting agencies information they learn resulted from identity 
theft; furthermore, furnishers must have procedures to respond to a 
notice from a consumer reporting agency that the agency has 
blocked such information.233 Agencies, in turn, must provide fraud 
alerts in reports and block identity theft-related information, among 
other duties.234 
 
(C) the consumer obtained possession of goods, services, or money as a 
result of the blocked transaction or transactions. 
§ 1681c-2(c)(1). 
The duty of nationwide consumer reporting agencies to develop procedures to refer identity 
theft complaints, fraud requests, and information block requests to one another. § 1681s(f). 
The conduct required by this subsection is subject to preemption pursuant to § 
1681t(b)(5)(G). 
 228.  The following duties of federal agencies are covered by an express preemption 
provision: The Federal Trade Commission’s duty to prepare a summary of rights of identity 
theft victims, and consumer reporting agency’s duties to provide consumers who complain of 
being the victim of fraud or identity theft with the summary. § 1681g(d). States may not 
impose any requirement or prohibition “with respect to the disclosures required to be made” 
by this subsection. § 1681t(b)(3). 
The duty of designated federal agencies to draft “red flag guidelines and regulations.” § 
1681m(e). The conduct required by this subsection is subject to preemption pursuant to 
section 1681t(b)(5)(F). 
 229.  The duty of businesses who have transacted with an identity thief to provide to the 
victim information about the transaction or transactions. § 1681g(e). The subject matter of 
this subsection is subject to preemption pursuant to section 1681t(b)(1)(G). Furthermore, 
states may not impose any requirement or prohibition “with respect to the disclosures required 
to be made” by this subsection. § 1681t(b)(3). 
 230.  The duty of owners of debts resulting from identity theft who have been properly 
notified to not “sell, transfer, or place for [debt] collection [the] debt.” § 1681m(f). The 
conduct required by this subsection is subject to preemption pursuant to section 
1681t(b)(5)(F). 
 231.  The duty of debt collectors who learn that the debts that they are attempting to 
collect “may be fraudulent or . . . the result of identity theft” to notify the person on whose 
behalf the collector is acting about these qualities of the information, and to provide certain 
information to the consumer upon request. § 1681m(g). The conduct required by this 
subsection is subject to preemption pursuant to section 1681t(b)(5)(F). 
 232.  See supra text accompanying notes 226 to 227. 
 233.  See supra text accompanying note 226. 
 234.  See supra text accompanying note 227. 
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In assessing the relationship between state identity theft 
provisions and the FCRA, a California district court dismissed a 
preemption challenge to a state identity theft provision that allowed 
theft victims to sue creditors that seek to recover from the victim a 
claim incurred by an identity thief in the victim’s name.235 The 
opinion narrowly construed the “subject matter” reach of 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1681s-2, one of the provisions identified in the FCRA’s subject 
matter preemption provisions.236 The court rejected the consumer 
reporting agency’s arguments that two different provisions of section 
1681s-2 that pertained to identity theft bore a subject matter that 
extended to and nullified the state provision.237 The court 
characterized the plaintiff ’s action against the defendant—who 
sought to force the plaintiff to pay the identity thief ’s debt—as one 
that “concern[ed] the direct relationship between the credit provider 
and the consumer,” rather than one that fell within the “subject 
matter” of a furnisher’s reporting of credit information to a credit 
reporting agency.238 Thus, the court carefully analyzed the content of 
the specific subsections of the FCRA’s furnisher obligations rather 
than simply concluding that the preempting provision should be 
construed as covering any state claim against a furnisher.239 
In contrast, some courts have construed the subject matter 
preemption effect of the FCRA’s provision regulating furnishers as 
broadly preempting any claim that relates to furnisher behavior, 
 
 235.  CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.92–.97 (2012). Identity theft victims can sue to establish 
that they were the victims of identity theft and, thus, not responsible to a claimant for debts 
incurred by the thief. 
 236.  15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(F); Pasternak v. Trans Union, C07-04980 MJJ, 2008 WL 
928840, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2008). 
 237.  Pasternak, 2008 WL 928840, at *4. One FCRA provision pertains to the duties of 
furnishers upon an agency’s notice of identity theft and imposing on furnishers a duty to 
refrain from refurnishing the disputed information, § 1681s-2(a)(6), while the other requires 
furnishers to take certain actions upon receiving an identity theft complaint from a consumer, 
§ 1681s-2(a)(8). 
 238.  Pasternak, 2008 WL 928840, at *4. 
 239.  For similar careful, though less detailed analysis, see Lichtenfels v. Crook, 
CV065007438S, 2007 WL 2938716, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 26, 2007) (dismissing 
state law claims based on allegations of furnisher behavior that fell within section 1681s-2, but 
retaining the others); Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Lichtenfels, CV044003402S, 2007 
WL 2938730, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 26, 2007) (same). 
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without carefully examining the precise contours of the different 
responsibilities identified within that section.240 
A different federal court has also indicated that the FCRA’s 
express preemption provisions may bar the New Mexico law that 
overlaps with the FCRA’s identity theft debt-blocking provision. The 
FCRA requires consumer reporting agencies to block the reporting 
of identity theft debts that a consumer has properly identified as 
arising from the work of an identity thief.241 However, the FCRA 
provision allows an agency to decline to block or rescind the barrier 
to reporting debts resulting from identity theft if it “reasonably 
determines that” one of three conditions was met—the information 
was erroneously blocked, the consumer made a material 
misrepresentation about the information blocked, or the consumer 
benefitted from the blocked transaction.242 New Mexico’s 
 
 240.  See, e.g., Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 888 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that the FCRA preempted a state provision requiring furnishers who receive notice of 
a dispute to investigate and review relevant information); Sukiasyan v. OCS Recovery Inc., CV 
11-9622GAFCWX, 2013 WL 490683, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2013) (holding that a 
California statutory provision regulating furnishers that provide negative credit information 
was preempted); Harrold v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., C12-02987WHA, 2012 WL 
4097708, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2012) (concluding that claims brought pursuant to CAL. 
CIV. CODE § 1785.25(b), (c), and (f), which impose accuracy requirements on furnishers of 
information to credit reporting agencies, were preempted by 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(F)); 
Oganyan v. Square Two Fin., CV11-10226RGK VKB, 2012 WL 3656355, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 
Aug. 24, 2012) (holding that the section 1681t(b)(1)(F) preempted a California statutory 
provision regulating furnishers that provide negative credit information, and also a provision 
regarding furnishers’ reinvestigations, which the court characterized as “fall[ing] within the 
general ambit” of section 1681s-2); Subhani v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, C12-
01857WHA, 2012 WL 1980416, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2012) (concluding that claims 
brought against a furnisher under a state statute that imposed parallel requirements to those of 
section 1681s-2(a)); Banga v. Allstate Ins. Co., CIVS081518LKKEFBPS, 2010 WL 1267841, 
at *5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2010) (holding that the FCRA preempted a claim against a furnisher 
brought under California’s unfair competition law to the extent that it was predicated on 
violations of section 1681s-2(a) and (b)); Drew v. Equifax Info. Servs., C 07-00726 SI, 2007 
WL 2028745, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2007) (holding that the FCRA preempted a claim 
against a furnisher brought under a state statute with similarities to section 1681s-2, though 
refusing to dismiss a state claim arising from a user’s conduct rather than a furnisher’s); see also 
Wang v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 681 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (construing 
California’s unfair competition law as imposing a “requirement or prohibition” by prohibiting 
“‘any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice’”); Howard v. Blue Ridge Bank, 
371 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1143–44 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (concluding that the 1681s-2 preemption 
provision precluded a claim under California’s unfair competition law that sought to impose a 
remedy for a violation of the FCRA’s provisions). 
 241.  15 U.S.C. § 1681c-2. 
 242.  § 1681c-2(c)(1). 
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overlapping provision appears to have the same general intent as the 
FCRA’s blocking provision—that of protecting consumers from 
being tarnished by debts that they did not create. However, the New 
Mexico provision is more protective of identity theft victims, because 
it does not permit consumer reporting agencies to evade their 
responsibilities to block identity theft-related debt by engaging in 
their own independent review of the block and, thereafter, 
unilaterally rescinding it.243 Rather, the New Mexico law permits an 
agency to lift the block only if the consumer requests it or a court 
orders it.244 
However, the FCRA expressly preempts state laws with respect 
to the conduct required by the blocking provision.245 Accordingly, 
the main industry association for consumer credit reporting, the 
Consumer Data Industry Association, sought to enjoin enforcement 
of the New Mexico provision.246 The district court dismissed the 
complaint on the grounds that the CDIA could not establish 
standing and therefore the case was nonjusticiable, but the Tenth 
Circuit reversed, concluding that the declaratory relief the CDIA 
sought would sufficiently redress its injury.247 The court’s discussion 
of the preemptive effects of the FCRA cause some concern. Rather 
than addressing the quite narrow preemption provision that would 
apply, the court stated grandly that “[t]he FCRA leaves no room for 
overlapping state regulations.” As discussed infra, this substantially 
misstates the text of the FCRA.248 
Two points oppose a broad reading of these identity theft-related 
preemption provisions. First, these specific preemption provisions 
should be construed in light of the introductory command of the 
preemption section, that except as provided, the FCRA does not 
“annul, alter, affect, or exempt any person . . . from complying with 
the laws of any State . . . for the prevention or mitigation of identity 
theft, except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent [with the 
Act], and then only to the extent of the inconsistency.”249 This 
 
 243.  N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-3A-3.1(D), (E) (2010). 
 244.  § 56-3A-3.1(E). 
 245.  15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(5)(C). 
 246.  Consumer Data Indus. Ass’n v. King, 678 F.3d 898, 902–03 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 247.  Id.  
 248.  See infra text accompanying notes 249 to 252. 
 249.  15 U.S.C. § 1681t(a) (emphasis added). 
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countervailing instruction indicates that preemption should be 
limited to only such state statutes that overlap nearly edge to edge 
with one of the identified FCRA provisions. 
Furthermore, as discussed supra, the Supreme Court has 
deferred to state legislation that supports the purpose of the 
corresponding federal law. As an additional argument against express 
preemption of the New Mexico identity theft provision, both the 
FCRA provisions and the New Mexico provision have the intent of 
protecting consumers from debts that they did not create; they differ 
in their details, not in their aim. Accordingly, the reasoning of Rowe, 
where the pro-commerce aim of the federal statute differed from and 
conflicted with the anti-tobacco aim of the state statute, can be 
meaningfully distinguished. Furthermore, the aim of the New 
Mexico identity theft provision—protecting consumers—is one that 
has traditionally been the province of the states.250  
Nothing in the FCRA’s blocking provision requires a consumer 
reporting agency to rescind a block based on its own determination 
that the block was placed in error. Rather, the Act clearly states that 
an agency “may decline to block, or may rescind any block” in the 
identified circumstances.251 Therefore, the absence of required 
 
 250.  Admittedly, the state and federal regimes having the same aim might not immunize 
the state provision from preemption. For instance, the Supreme Court concluded in Arizona v. 
United States that some provisions of Arizona’s statute regulating unlawful aliens were 
preempted by federal law. 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502, 2505, 2507. However, there the state law 
involved immigration, a subject over which “[t]he Government of the United States has broad, 
undoubted power” and thus two state provisions that had immigration-management goals 
similar to that of the federal regime were nonetheless preempted. The first, which made the 
failure to comply with federal alien-registration requirements a state misdemeanor because 
immigration bears the power of field preemption: “[T]he Federal Government has occupied 
the field of alien registration.” Id. at 2502. Another provision, making it a misdemeanor for an 
alien to seek work in the state, was preempted through implied obstacle preemption because 
the means sought by the state law’s provisions (criminal enforcement) created an obstacle to 
the aims of the federal regime, control through a civil mechanism. Id. at 2505. Similarly, a 
third provision, which authorized state officials to arrest aliens without a warrant under 
specified circumstances, interfered with the federal scheme by expanding the circumstances 
under which state officers could act as immigration agents. Id. at 2506–07. A fourth provision, 
however, survived preemption notwithstanding the federal law’s interest in maintaining control 
over immigration because the Court concluded that it was premature to rule before the state 
showed how it would interpret it. Id. at 2510. 
However, in contrast to the area of consumer protection, this case involved an area that is 
expressly reserved to the federal government in the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 
(granting the federal government power to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization”). 
 251.  15 U.S.C. § 1681c-2(c)(1). 
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conduct leaves nothing for section 1681t(b)(5)(C) to preempt 
regarding the rescission of (as opposed to the placement of) a block. 
Second, the preemption provisions extend only to the “conduct 
required by” the identified FCRA provisions, in contrast to the 
broader “subject matter regulated under” relationship that applies to 
a clutch of other preempting provisions.252 
However, if the New Mexico law is ultimately found to be 
preempted by the FCRA, New Mexico, along with other states, 
could perhaps achieve its goal by painting with a broader brush. The 
underlying problem with identity theft-related debt tainting a 
consumer’s credit report is not the actual source of the debt, but the 
fact of its inaccuracy. If a consumer reporting agency reported the 
debt of another person as belonging to the targeted consumer, the 
effects on the consumer would be just the same as if the misreported 
debt did not arise from identity theft, but merely from the mixing up 
by the agency of the targeted consumer with the debt’s true creator. 
The issue is the accuracy of the information that the agency chooses 
to assign to a consumer’s report. Accordingly, a state could mitigate 
the effects of identity theft by imposing stricter accuracy 
requirements on consumer reporting agencies, enhancing the 
penalties for inaccurate reporting, or both. While the FCRA does, in 
fact, impose certain accuracy requirements on agencies,253 it imposes 
nothing like strict attention to accuracy. Accordingly, by requiring 
agencies to meaningfully assess the accuracy of information initially, 
or to strictly verify it once it has been disputed by a consumer, a state 
could quite likely drastically reduce the pernicious effects of identity 
theft without stepping on the toes of the FCRA, which does not 
explicitly preempt state laws imposing accuracy standards on 
agencies, as opposed to furnishers.254 
Another fruitful way for states to thwart identity theft is through 
mandating that consumer reporting agencies impose security freezes 
on the files of consumers who request them. These permit a 
consumer to hide their credit information from new potential 
 
 252.  § 1681t(b)(1), (5). 
 253.  §§ 1681e(b), 1681i. 
 254.  See § 1681t(b)(1)(F), preempting states from regulating the subject matter of 
section 1681s-2, which imposes accuracy requirements on furnishers. 
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creditors255 while allowing the consumer to explicitly “thaw” the 
freeze for specific transactions. Several states have enacted such 
provisions and they can effectively block an identity thief from co-
opting a consumer’s credit record.256 
States seeking to legislate in the identity theft area should avoid 
implied impossibility preemption by ensuring that an agency, user, or 
furnisher can comply with both the FCRA and the proposed state 
law. Furthermore, states should proactively anticipate implied 
obstacle preemption arguments. Wyeth indicated a preference for 
consumer remedies, and some of the FCRA’s identity theft 
provisions deny consumers a private cause of action for the violation 
of identity theft specific provisions. For instance, the FCRA allows 
 
 255.  In general, such freezes may not hide reports from existing creditors. See, e.g., 815 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2MM(n) (providing that the freeze provisions do not apply to entities 
that the consumer owes). 
 256.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 8-35-1 to -3 (2002 & Supp. 2015); ALASKA STAT. §§ 
45.48.100–.290 (2014); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1698 (2013 & Supp. 2015); ARK. 
CODE ANN. §§ 4-112-101–14 (2011); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1785.11.2–.4, .6 (2012); COLO. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-14.3-106.6 to -106.9 (2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 36a-701–701a 
(2011 & Supp. 2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 §§ 2201–04 (2013); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 28-
3861 to -3864 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 501.005, 501.0051 (2010 & Supp. 2016); GA. 
CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-913 to -915 (2009 & Supp. 2015); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 489P-3 to 
489P-6 (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 28-52-101 to -109 (2013); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
505/2MM (2008 & Supp. 2016); IND. CODE §§ 24-5-24-1 to -17 (2013 & Supp. 2015); 
IOWA CODE §§ 714G.1–.11 (2013 & Supp. 2016); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-723 to -724 
(2005 & Supp. 2014); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 367.363–367.365 (2008); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 9:3571.1(H)–(Z), 3571.3 (2009 & Supp. 2016); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 
1310 (2009 & 2015 Supp.); MD. CODE ANN., Com. Law §§ 14-1212.1 to -1212.3 (2010); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93, §§ 56, 62A, 63, 64 (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 445.2531–
.2535 (2014); MINN. STAT. § 13C.016–.019 (2013); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 75-24-201 to -
217 (2009); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 407.1380–.1385 (2011); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-1727 
to -1736 (2015); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 8-2601 to -2615 (2012); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 
598C.300–598C.390 (2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 359-B:22 to -B:29 (2009); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 56:11-46 to -49 (2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 56-3A-2 to -6 (2010); N.Y. GEN. BUS. 
LAW § 380-t (McKinney 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-63 (2013); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 51-
33-01 to -14 (2007 & Supp. 2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.52 (2012); OKLA. STAT. 
tit. 24, §§ 149–59 (2008); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646A.606–646A.618 (2015); 73 PA. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 2501–10 (2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 6-48-1 to -9 (2014); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-
20-160 to -161, -200 (2015 & Supp. 2015); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 54-15-1 to -16 (2004 & 
Supp. 2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2108 to -2109 (2013); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE 
§§ 20.031–.039, 20.21–.31 (2015); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-45-201 to -205 (2013 & Supp. 
2015); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2480h–j (2014); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-441.1 to -444.3 
(2014); WASH. Rev. Code §§ 19.182.170–.210 (2013); W. Va. Code §§ 46A-6L-101 to -105 
(2016); Wis. STAT. §§ 100.54–.545 (2010 & Supp. 2015); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-12-501 to 
-509 (2015). 
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consumers to obtain transaction information from businesses that 
have been tricked by an identity thief into relying on the victim’s 
identity.257 However, the Act denies consumers a right to sue over a 
violation of that provision.258 Instead, only the Federal Trade 
Commission and designated state officials may sue to enforce this 
provision.259 A state law that provided a remedy could complement 
the FCRA, promoting the Congressional preference for allowing 
consumers to have remedies that the Wyeth court noted.260 Now, 
quite possibly a defendant might argue that Congress’s explicit 
carve-out of this section from the standard FCRA remedies 
provisions261 negated such a general preference in this specific 
context. However, one response might be that, while Congress did 
not intend to provide a federal remedy and have such litigation in 
federal courts, nonetheless, Congress preferred that states determine 
individually whether a remedy was appropriate and whether each 
state wanted its courts to accommodate such claims, filling that gap 
in the FCRA. Such a construction receives support from the anti-
preemption language of section 1681t(a) along with the fact that 
consumer protection is typically the province of state law.262  
While the FCRA does preempt states from imposing any 
“requirement or prohibition . . . with respect to any subject matter 
regulated under . . . section 1681i of this title, relating to the time 
by which a consumer reporting agency must take any action,”263 that 
could fairly be read narrowly, pursuant to the principles described 
supra,264 to prevent a state from requiring an agency to complete a 
reinvestigation of disputed information before the end of the 30 day 
period that the section designates.265 Even if it were construed to 
read more broadly to extend to any reinvestigation of accuracy 
 
 257.  15 U.S.C. § 1681g(e). 
 258.  § 1681g(e)(6). 
 259.  §§ 1681g(e)(6), 1681s. 
 260.  Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 574 (2009). 
 261.  §§ 1681n, 1681o. 
 262.  See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Abrams, 897 F.2d 34, 41–42 (2d Cir. 1990) 
(“Because consumer protection law is a field traditionally regulated by the states, compelling 
evidence of an intention to preempt is required in this area . . . .”). 
 263.  § 1681t(b)(1). 
 264.  See supra text accompanying notes 147 to 153. 
 265.  § 1681i(a)(1)(A), (B). 
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standards, states could still motivate consumer reporting agencies to 
be more accurate (and thereby withhold identity theft-related data) 
by imposing a stricter initial standard of accuracy, or by enhancing 
the penalties available for inaccuracy, neither of which is covered by 
the Act’s express preemption provision. 
Nor should such provisions, or any of the other kinds of 
legislative protections described supra, be preempted under either an 
implied impossibility or implied obstacle preemption analysis. 
Pursuant to PLIVA and Mutual Pharmaceutical, the standard for 
impossibility preemption would require the regulated party to show 
that it could not simultaneously comply with the federal and the 
state standard. But none of the proposed courses of action would 
impose that kind of conflict. 
To succeed in an implied obstacle preemption analysis, a 
regulated party would have to show that Congress’s purpose 
sufficiently differed from that of the state that complying with the 
state law would “stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”266 
However, keep in mind that the FCRA is, at its heart, a consumer 
protection statute, not a consumer reporting agency industry 
protection statute nor a furnisher or user protection statute.267 Along 
with the savings clause language,268 the fact that consumer protection 
is an area traditionally left to the states,269 and the ample room that 
the FCRA has left for states to regulate, the area differs significantly 
from that of Rowe, where Congress sought to deregulate, rather than 
regulate; to clear the table of restrictions on trucking whether they 
be federal or state. Accordingly, states should take advantage of the 
invitation implicit in the introduction to the FCRA’s preemption 
section, which states that except as explicitly provided, the FCRA 
does not “exempt any person . . . from complying with the laws of 
 
 266.  Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
 267.  See § 1681(a)(b) (“It is the purpose of this [act] to require that consumer reporting 
agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit, 
personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the 
consumer.”) (emphasis added). 
 268.  § 1681t(a). 
 269.  See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Abrams, 897 F.2d 34, 41–42 (2d Cir. 1990) 
(“Because consumer protection law is a field traditionally regulated by the states, compelling 
evidence of an intention to preempt is required in this area . . . .”). 
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any State . . . for the prevention or mitigation of identity theft. . . .” 
Rigorous accuracy requirements on consumer reporting agencies 
would not only reduce identity theft but would benefit consumers 
and the users that rely on consumer reports. 
In sum, though the FCRA’s preemption provisions might appear 
at first glance to present pervasive obstacles to state regulation of 
reports about consumer’s financial information, in fact the Act leaves 
lots of room for states to craft legislation that will protect consumers’ 
privacy and reputations without hindering legitimate commercial 
uses for consumer reports.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The Great Recession may have revealed to us the extent of the 
baggage that attaches to our identities, and the effect of that heft on 
our opportunities to gain or advance in jobs, acquire credit, find a 
place to live, or insure our belongings. Those revelations have 
motivated many state legislatures to adjust the balance between the 
legitimate interests of those who investigate consumers and the 
privacy interests of consumers. 
To be effective, though, state provisions must avoid preemption 
by the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act. The breadth of those 
provisions turns not just on their words, but the interpretation of 
those words given the Supreme Court’s preemption jurisprudence. 
Broad statutory enactments that impose general duties, such as state 
deceptive practices act laws, may be less likely to fall victim to 
preemption. Furthermore, states can strengthen the likelihood that 
their measures will succeed by aligning the statutory purposes of 
their legislation with that of the federal Act—ensuring the accuracy 
of credit reports and promoting consumer protection. States will 
benefit from the Supreme Court’s “purpose presumption,” which 
prefers to avoid preempting legislation in those areas of states’ 
“historic police powers,”270 one of which is consumer protection. 
Given this backdrop, the types of provisions most likely to 
succeed are those that focus on forbidding users of reports from 
using a credit report for certain purposes, such as employment.  
 
 270.  See supra text accompanying notes 131 to 134. 
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Limits on the content of consumer reports are more vulnerable 
to preemption, but should survive so long as the FCRA’s content 
preemption provisions receive a justifiably tight reading. Accordingly, 
states should be able to restrict consumer reporting agencies from 
placing specific criminal record information in credit reports. 
However, state regulation of identity theft-related debt will likely fall 
to the FCRA’s preemption provisions, which give the federal act 
nearly a monopoly over such information. Nonetheless, states could 
achieve the objectives sought by most identity theft credit report 
provisions by regulating in an area that the FCRA does not protect 
through its preemption provisions, such as by tightening overall 
accuracy requirements imposed on consumer reporting agencies or 
enhancing remedies available to injured consumers. 
States should evaluate the legitimate needs of employers, 
creditors, landlords, and ascertain the level of access to consumers’ 
information that will both fulfill those needs while cloaking those 
aspects of their citizens’ lives that individuals prefer to keep private. 
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